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I am disinclined to believe in the hidden power of the immanent 
divinities which, as Thales thought, all things are full of. Belief in 
the Christian God implies, so far as I am concerned, a positive 
disbelief in Fate: necessity be damned, for all I care. I refuse — let 
me make the religious nature of this act of un-faith clear, I refuse 
— until, if ever, I should be shown otherwise, to believe the 
primitive superstitions that there are implicit necessities within 
being, that being has, as its very reality, an inner warrant to 
command assent, and that invisible predeterminations constitute it 
and make it definable as that which has an antecedent call on the 
intellect.  















CHRISTIANITY AND REVOLUTION: LESSON OF CUBA (1963) 
This book is actually an essay in political philosophy addressing the relationship between 
Church and State. The lesson to be learned, from a theological perspective of pre-
revolutionary Cuba, is that the Church may not remain spiritually relevant to the faithful 
as the traditional relationship between Church and State begins to end. 
 
FUTURE OF BELIEF: Theism in a World Come of Age (1966) 
This book concerns the daily experience of Roman Catholics at the time of the Second 
Vatican Council. The context reveals the issues and passions of the day. He shows a way 
out of the Hellenist cultural setting, while remaining faithful to the truth it has expressed.  
 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF (1969) 
Will Christianity undertake to direct its own evolution or continue to evolve at an 
obsolete rate and in a pre-conscious mode? Dewart argues that the reshaping of the future 
is but the other side of the past. The dehellenization of Christian belief does not mean the 
rejection of the Hellenist past, it is not un-hellenization. The task to which philosophy is 
called today is to set dehellenized foundations that transcend metaphysical philosophy, 
varieties of which can still be recognized in our contemporary belief systems.   
 
RELIGION, LANGUAGE AND TRUTH (1970) 
The religious crisis of the Catholic Church has to do with philosophical questions that 
underlie theological and religious disputes. What are merely philosophical views have 
often been vested with the certitude of faith and the authority of revelation. We may take 
advantage of critical insights from human experience in order to improve upon our 
concept of God, religion, language and truth.  
 
EVOLUTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS: The Role of Speech in the Origin and 
Development of Human Nature (1989) 
Given Dewart's notion of dehellenization this book is a clear and useful presentation of 
his philosophical thought for contemporary philosophy. The deconstruction of one’s 
inherited way of thinking is a threatening activity. As an invitation to philosophical 
growth, dehellenization is the conscious creation of the future of belief within an 
evolutionary context. 
 
HUME’S CHALLENGE AND THE RENEWAL OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY (2016) 
According to Dewart, modern philosophy stagnated because of the failures, which he 
tries to correct, of an earlier philosophical age. His attempts at correction are concerned 
with human sense perception and its truth content as understood within Western 
philosophy since its origin in ancient Greece. In order to clarify common sense through 
philosophy he focused on experience and understanding and the consciousness of the 
human mind which in turn led him to the cultural question of the contribution of 
Christianity to philosophy. This question ultimately became the foundation for his 
“dehellenization” of Western thought, the fruit of which is this book. Dewart has 
proffered a challenge for modern philosophy to further demystification of the “laws of 
nature.” Modern philosophy needs to focus consciously on cognition, reality and 
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While Allan Savage is the author of thirteen previous books 
and numerous articles, I submit that this one is the most personal 
that he has written. 
In this work, he allows us into his scholarly and inquisitive 
mind as he retraces his philosophical and theological background, 
sharing with us, essentially, his conclusions with respect to his 
personal, spiritual journey. Having found himself in a world being 
propelled forward by social, cultural and religious change and 
being unsatisfied with the answers provided by his classical 
formation, he came to find a home in existential, 
phenomenological philosophy. Within the Western school of 
scholastic philosophical thought, he viewed the answers to his 
questions regarding his personal, contemporary experience as 
rooted in a static past, one with authoritarian answers assumed to 
be relevant for all time. 
Influenced by the ressourcement partisans of Vatican II as well 
as by the ‘dehellenization’ of Western philosophy advocated by his 
teacher and mentor, Leslie Dewart, Savage came to the conclusion 
that existential phenomenological philosophy provided a method 
by which his spiritual life was both revitalized and evolutionary. 
Here he is able to continuously construct his present and future 
lifeworld in which are incorporated his relationship with God and 
with his faith community. 
I first met Father Allan when he was appointed pastor of St. 
Patrick’s Parish in Québec City in 2000. Shortly after his arrival, 
we began a discussion group that met weekly. It soon became 
apparent that our discussions were not to be ‘business as usual.’ 
We were not simply to be re-schooled in the past or re-catechized. 
Through his persistent questioning, he enabled us to recognize 
where we were situated along our own spiritual timeline and how 
we got there. As a scholar in both theology and philosophy, he 
rooted our present in our past, returning us always to the revelation 
of the scriptural roots of our faith. It is fair to say that in this 
process I was sometimes escorted and sometimes launched, with 
the inevitable turbulence, into the future of my belief. While I was 
fully aware that the ground was shifting beneath my feet, it was not 
until much later that I realized that the axis of my spiritual world 
had tilted and that I was, indeed, in a different spiritual place. In 
some sense, the path through which Savage takes the reader in this 
book mirrors the one he led us through in those discussions. 
I must state, for the benefit of the reader, that I am one of the 
‘untutored’ in matters philosophical. For those who are similarly 
situated, there is much knowledge and insight to be gained from 
this book. I cite, as one example, the discussion of words ending in 
‘-ism’ versus those which end in ‘-ity.’ If one examines this in 
specific reference to ‘Catholicism’ versus ‘Catholicity’ one 
understands how this provides the basis for a more expansive and 
inclusive spiritual vision. It reflects and explains his personal 
convictions with respect to ecumenism. In particular, it has 
influenced how I see myself in relation to the broader faith 
community of the People of God. I am very grateful for this new 
perspective. For the intellectually curious, A Future for Disbelief, 
has much to offer for reflection, opening up for the reader the 
possibility of new perspectives and spiritual growth.  
 
Patricia Shallow 










An Introductory Note on Theology 
Throughout this book, I cite theological examples of the changes 
in my philosophical thinking. For the reader’s benefit, I present 
this introductory note on theology. The note is part of Chapter 5 
(pp. 95-103) of Edward Schillebeeckx’s, Revelation and Theology, 
which I have edited, in précis form, presenting it in his own words.  
 
The term theology has, in the course of time, been applied 
with various meanings to different realities. Initially, the word 
was used with reference to the mythical stories of the gods. 
Theologians in this sense were the ancient poets such as Homer 
(12th to 8th century B.C.?) and Hesiod (circa 700 B.C.), who 
wrote theogonies, [i.e., genealogies of a group of gods], and told 
the myths of the Olympian gods. Theology, in this sense, was 
contrasted with meteorology which dealt in a more scientific 
manner with the divine heavenly bodies. Aristotle (circa 384 
B.C.) spoke of theology as poetic myths about the gods. The 
view that these myths about the gods were simply a mythological 
form concealing true reference to God gradually became 
accepted. Plato (circa 428–348 B.C.) consciously dissociated the 
essential content of these myths from their mythological content. 
Aristotle also used the word theology with a new meaning or, at 
least changed its field of application. Making a three–fold 
division of science (epist m ) into the physical, mathematical, 
and theological, he raised theology to the level of a philosophical 
science and made it the “first” form of philosophical thought. 
This “first philosophy” was concerned with the highest causes of 
the visible, divine, astral world.  
The first sense [of the term theology] lay behind Aristotle’s 
use of the word which meant ‘to speculate about the gods.’ Later, 
in the Hellenistic period (323 B.C.–31 B.C.) the word meant, in 
the context of emperor–worship, ‘to venerate as a god.’ 
The word theologia acquired a new application in view of the 
swing towards cosmic religion. The deities were no longer the 
gods of Olympus, but [of] the cosmos itself – the meteora, or 






These ideas persisted up to the patristic period. Augustine 
(+430) adopted the classic definition: “There are three kinds of 
theology, that is, of the discipline which is concerned with the 
gods: one of these is the mythic, the second is the physical, and 
the third is the civil.” In this definition, the ‘civil’ kind of 
theology means the theology of public worship, the worship of 
the emperor as god. The term theology was Christianized very 
late [in history] because of the reluctance on the part of 
Christians to use pagan terminology. It was from the fourth 
century onwards that the Greek Fathers used the word theology.  
The word theology was not adopted as readily by the 
Western church. Abelard (1079–1142) was the first in the West 
to consistently use the word theology in the Christian theological 
sense. In the tradition of Abelard, as in the Byzantine theology, 
the word theology tended to mean a treatise about God himself, 
rather than the theology of the mystery of Christ.  
Aquinas (1225–1274) seldom used the term theology, and 
whenever he did so he used it in a very different sense from the 
sense in which we should use it now. The study of the human 
soul, because of its direct relationship with God, was called by 
Aquinas a theological study, whereas the study of the human 
body was not [called a theological study]. It is clear that the term 
theology did not have the full meaning in the scholastic period 
that it has today. It was in the period between Aquinas and Duns 
Scotus (1266–1308) that the word theology came to be used as 
the technical term for what had previously been known as Sacra 
Doctrina. It was especially speculative theology that was 
influential in bringing about this change from Sacra Doctrina to 
theology. The wide meaning which theology previously had was 
thrust into the background by a discursive procedure which had 
been adopted by theology and which had become a “science of 
conclusions.” Thus, the classic term theology was placed in the 
category of speculative theology from the very moment of its 
birth. 
Later, this had unfortunate effects. The Sacra Doctrina was 
divided in the modern period into all kinds of independent 
disciplines. Moral theology, towards the end of the sixteenth 




century, apologetic theology in the seventeenth century, and later 
dogmatic theology, that aimed to define the limits of revealed 
religion as distinct from all the questions discussed by the 
scholastics.  
In order to establish the concrete structure of theology and its 
distinctive methodological procedures, it is not possible to 
proceed from the natural data of what scientific work is, whether 
these are the data of the Aristotelian scientific concept or those 
of the modern, positive, phenomenological, and “humane” 
sciences. The structure of revelation itself and the act of faith 
associated with it must suggest the type of reflection to which 
faith in Christ can lead. Only then shall we be able to throw light 




Schillebeeckx’s comments were published in 1967, at the 
time of writing when, it seems to me, that theology as ministry 
had not yet been recognized by professional theologians. 
However, a generation later, the seeds for such recognition were 
being sown by certain contemporary theologians and 
independent, educated minds. Among them I include Paul 
Trudinger. He says in a lecture in 1986: 
I have suggested that one of the most important 
tasks to which we are called as pastoral workers, 
as healers, is to foster amongst persons we relate 
to, the practice of the presence of God [my 
italics]. We should enable people to experience 
being enfolded in God’s love. I believe we should 
give much more time and attention than often 
seems to be given in our ministerial and clinical 
training programs to help each other to learn to 
“to pray without ceasing.” This is not to minimize 
the importance of other aspects of disciplined 
study and practice – in the case of seminary 
education, for example, of Biblical interpretation, 





and counselling…. We obviously cannot “say 
prayers” without ceasing. When we say prayers, 
we do the talking, as it were. … No, we are little 
skilled in realizing God’s presence [Trudinger’s 
italics] 
Thus, we can now include ministry and pastoral care to 
Schillebeecks’s summation of “theology in all its many 
activities” expanding the understanding of theology in the 












I had wondered at times, beginning in my early adult years, 
and I continue to wonder today if there ever would be some kind 
of universal philosophical agreement, some kind of unity of 
philosophical understanding in the world. This book is my 
attempt to think through this many–sided topic and arrive at 
conclusions that satisfy me, at least up to this point in my 
thinking. Others, without a doubt, will need to arrive at their own 
conclusions. I think that for such a unity of philosophical 
agreement to be achieved, humans would need to surrender their 
unique powers of self–reflection and self–identity to some sort of 
universal uniformity constituting their nature, if such a thing 
were possible.  
When, in my early adult years, I encountered individuals 
from various cultures who often held beliefs different from mine, 
as well as, differing beliefs among themselves, I was frequently 
frustrated by their differing opinions. However, by delving 
deeper into these differing beliefs, while in university, it 
eventually became apparent to me that Western philosophers 
favoured a particular interpretive perspective based on classical 
Greek philosophical understanding. In hindsight, I recall that this 
classical Greek philosophical understanding often left my 
questions needing further answers.  
I am aware as well, that in those years there had been what 
amounts to progress in the sciences, but that nothing similar had 
occurred in philosophy. I wondered why science had advanced 
and philosophy had not appeared to advance. The answer to that 
question, I came to believe, was to be found within the respective 
methodologies and objectives of the disciplines of science and 
philosophy. Looking into the historical development of science 
and philosophy, I discovered that originally there was no distinct 
separation between the two. Initially, each discipline accepted 
the other as searching for the same thing, that is, the truth, 
although each was searching from differing points of view. In 
time, however, as history records, science did branch off from 





different founding principles and their terms of reference became 
mutually less understandable and acceptable. This resulted in 
Western philosophers deciding that philosophy, not being a 
system of proof–providing propositions, was not a science, but 
an art.  
I recall that I was disposed to view the relationship between 
the two, not as antagonistic as some academics might, but as 
complimentary. I recognized that science and philosophy both 
provided answers to the deeper questions I had about life, but 
from different points of view. From my perspective, the data 
presented by the scientist provided the subject matter for the 
philosopher to contemplate, whether classically or 
phenomenologically. In other words, the goal of the philosopher 
is to seek the meaning of, and an insight into the facts that the 
scientist provides.  
Unlike classical philosophy, however, phenomenological 
philosophy takes a different approach to meaning and cannot be 
taught as a system of thought, as has been done in the West with 
classical Greek philosophy. Rather, phenomenological 
philosophy must be personally experienced without the classical 
intent of searching to disclose an objective sought–after truth 
somehow contained within the facts. That is, phenomenological 
philosophy amounts to an interpretive stance that the philosopher 
adopts towards life, rather than a system of living to be 
embraced. As a phenomenological philosopher, then, I determine 
the meaning and significance of my experience from a subjective 
point of view, but not in isolation from the community in which I 
live. The meaning and significance of my experience and that of 
my community will be mutually understood through an inter–
subjective awareness.  
Scientific techniques are difficult to apply to the study of 
personal meaning and to the significance of one’s life with any 
sense of authority or accuracy of interpretation. Nor can 
scientific technologies provide any theory to account for the 
meaning and significance of the life of a community. But since 
this is not the purpose of scientific technique, another discipline 




is needed to explain the meaning and significance of life. That 
discipline, I discovered, is phenomenological philosophy.  
During my studies for the Bachelor of Arts degree, I soon 
realized that the classical philosophy of Western Europe could 
not answer the existential philosophical questions that arose in 
my experience. In short, classical philosophy presented a system 
of understanding that was inadequate for my contemporary 
experience. 
As I see it today, instead of the classical method of 
philosophy, the phenomenological method of philosophy is 
increasingly being used to contemplate the meaning of one’s 
personal existence in the world, even in an unconscious way in 
the day to day experience of individuals. But there is also 
conscious resistance in the Anglo–American academic culture to 
phenomenological philosophy. Also known as Continental 
Philosophy, and is somewhat rarely favoured professionally in 
the universities. I suspect that the dynamic of phenomenological 
interpretation is not often recognized as philosophy consciously 
undertaken by an individual. Rather, the dynamic appears as 
common sense until further reflected upon.   
Scientific interpretation, as we know, requires narrow 
parameters restricted solely to demonstrable facts, which change 
in light of new discoveries. I see no such parameters or progress 
in philosophical thought as I see in scientific interpretation. In 
lieu of progress, I see in phenomenological thought a deepening 
appreciation of my personal life from an existential, as well as an 
evolutionary perspective. As I matured, rather than frustrate me, 
the varieties of philosophical perspectives that were open to me 
inspired me to undertake my own critique of philosophy. How I 
began this critique and arrived at my decision is the modest 
intent of this book. 1 
                                                     
I am thankful to Elizabeth Dewart, Leslie Dewart’s daughter, for supplying 
me with a copy of her father’s posthumously published book, Hume’s 
Challenge and the Renewal of Modern Philosophy. Any reader familiar with 
the works of Dewart (1922–2009) will no doubt recognize his influence upon 
my thinking. I was taught by Dewart at the University of Toronto, in the early 





Checking the references listed at the back of this short 
volume, the reader will notice that the latest reference is dated 
2008. This is deliberate. I have listed works that were introduced 
to me, for the most part, during my university years. Some I 
discovered later. Since then, I have continuously built upon these 
authors’ philosophical insights and continue to do so right up to 
the present day. These texts have assisted me in developing a 
critical way of thinking as I sifted through and re–organized my 
thoughts.  
As a rule, I have not cited exact references from any book. 
But, I have often paraphrased the thoughts of the authors whose 
works I have consulted. It is through the bibliography at the end 
of the book that they receive due credit for influencing the 
changes in my philosophical thinking.  
Finally, as any reader will soon discover, I am presenting my 
thoughts neither in a conventional, nor a systematic manner. This 
symbol § and the corresponding heading in the text indicates a 
shift in the direction of my thought. This indicator should help 
the reader to make the transition from one notion to another more 
easily and make my ideas appear less disconnected, although 




                                                                                                                   
elsewhere. (Dehellenization and Dr. Dewart Revisited: A First Person 
Philosophical Reflection, 2009, [2016])




My Philosophical Life–World 
 
The question I ask myself in this book is: Am I experiencing 
a problem with the philosophical foundations of my knowledge? 
My experience of a world of scientific facts, as well as logical, 
rational relationships no longer satisfies my philosophical 
curiosity for knowledge about my life–world. There are various 
systems of knowledge available to me to explore my intellectual 
curiosity: philosophical, psychological, scientific, etc., but none 
of these systems has been able to adequately express the totality 
or complexity of the experience of my life–world. As I 
eventually discovered, however, I was able to express my 
understanding of my life–world more adequately through a 
phenomenological philosophy. 
In my life–world, the sciences are required for a dialogue 
with philosophy, although it does not have to be a dialogue of 
equal partners. I have contrasted their respective methods of 
interpretation many times and I have found them both wanting 
with respect to the philosophical and scientific foundations for 
my knowledge, especially my religious knowledge. Although I 
found that my scientific knowledge fared much better, I am 
limiting my comments to a philosophical understanding as it 
pertains to my religious convictions.  
Upon finding the traditional approach to my philosophical 
knowledge wanting, I converted to a phenomenological 
philosophical method of interpreting my experience. Given my 
religious convictions as a phenomenological philosopher, God is 
not the direct focus of my philosophy. Rather, the case is that I 
contemplate other phenomena than God in order to reach God, 
without God, as it were. According to Laycock (1986), this 
notion of reaching God without God was introduced by Edmund 
Husserl, (1859–1938), the principal founder of phenomenology. 
As I explain in this book, I use phenomenological philosophy to 
interpret my religious experience so that I can give meaning and 
significance to my life as the ancient Greek philosophers gave 





I recall that I experienced early on in my philosophical 
contemplation two significant phenomena. Firstly, that I had 
inherited my religious world–view which I did not make or 
design. Secondly, I also knew that I could not stop the 
philosophical evolution of my inherited religious world–view. 
As time went on, I came to understand that I was personally 
involved in the direction of its evolution to some degree. 
However, my world remained principally determined by the 
dominant notions of ancient Greek philosophy, notwithstanding 




Holism: A New Approach 
As a Western Christian I live, as many of the faithful do, 
with the anxiety and tensions felt in the religious and spiritual 
life that come with the end of conventional Christianity. Yet, 
within these anxieties and tensions I see indications of alternative 
approaches within philosophy that could lead to a different 
future. One is to abandon critical philosophy altogether and live 
a “wysiwyg” life–style; what you see is what you get. This 
would be a sort of fatalist approach to life which would be a 
return to the philosophical past. Another is to radically re-define 
or up-date classical terminology, a sort of philosophical 
aggiornamento which assumes that no real evolutionary change 
has occurred in philosophical concepts. To my mind, these 
alternative approaches arise, in fact, from the failure of classical 
philosophy at trying to discover the meaning of contemporary 
life. Among these approaches that could lead to a different future 
I have discovered the process of philosophical dehellenization 
which has enabled me, in fact, to consciously create the future of 
my belief. The shift in my understanding to a process of 
dehellenization ultimately led me to the theological realization 
that the Church of Christ, understood as subsisting in various 
denominations, does not exclude those who have been 
excommunicated from a visible Christian denomination. I 




discuss more below about who is “in” and who is “out” of the 
church.  
Presently, as I write this book, I contemplate my religious 
experience existentially, not speculatively, as I once did. That is 
to say that the world into which I was born has become my life–
world. That is to say, my world of common sense understanding 
has become my life–world of existential understanding. By life–
world I mean my conscious everyday world of immediate 
experience. I mean, in fact, Husserl’s notion of Lebenswelt.  
Through my existential contemplation of God, through my 
phenomenological philosophy, I consciously transcend the 
boundaries of my creaturely existence in such a way that I 
become more God–like, as it were. In becoming more God–like, 
then, I now understand myself through a holistic perspective, that 
is, through a transcendental perspective, wherein I am greater 
than the totality of all my individual parts. And, I do mean a 
holistic, not a wholistic, perspective. These words which are 
often understood as similar, or just a variant in the spelling of the 
same word are, in fact, not identical in meaning. More will be 
said about these terms below, but for the moment it is sufficient 
to understand holistic as denoting a phenomenological notion of 
the totality of an organism, and wholistic as denoting a classical 
notion of a total organism. The holistic understanding of totality 





I come to understand God through the same process that I 
come to understand any other person, that is, through a mutual 
self–giving. This remains the case, even though 
phenomenologically understood, God is not one entity among 
others. Yet, God relates to me and I relate to God. As a believer, 
this relationship, for me, requires both a philosophical and 
theological understanding on my part given that God has been 
revealed within my life–world. However, as a philosopher and as 





different from revelation. In my experience, philosophy and 
theology originate with me and revelation originates with God. 
As a phenomenological philosopher, I consider the 
possibilities, probabilities and actualities in my life–world. Thus, 
I come to understand about God indirectly through my 
philosophical attitude. As a phenomenological theologian, I 
contemplate the active presence of God revealed in the concrete 
phenomena of my life–world. Through a phenomenological 
attitude, I relate to God’s active presence directly. In other 
words, through philosophy, I understand the gift; through 




The Past or The Future 
As with any personal relationship understood 
phenomenologically, my relationship with God defies 
objectivism but not objectivity. Objectivism is a notion that 
belongs to Hellenized philosophy and which prefers to preserve 
the past. Objectivity, on the other hand, is a notion that belongs 
to a phenomenological philosophy that prefers to create the 
future. Thus, the challenge presented to me was either to be a 
custodian of the past, by remaining within a Hellenized 
philosophy, or become an architect of the future by consciously 
initiating a phenomenological encounter with God in my life–
world. I discuss below more about a preserved past and a 
consciously created future. However, for the moment, it is 
sufficient to note that should I ever factor out my consciousness 
in the creation of the future of my belief, I will have removed 
that which differentiates me as a human being within the world. 
In choosing to create the future of my belief, as a human being 
within this world, I have come to realize that I am truly other and 
greater than the sum of my individual parts. The future of my 
belief involves the Catholicity of the church, not the Catholicism 
of the church of the future, which I discuss next.  




The Catholicity of Vatican II and the Church of the Future 
 
In addition to those academics who have a professional 
interest in phenomenological philosophy, I intend this book as a 
possible point of philosophical departure for any impulsive and 
untutored reader of philosophy who decides to undertake 
something different, thus challenging his or her mind with an 
unfamiliar topic. 2 With such individuals in mind, then, and 
without formal introduction to a theological perspective, I cut 
directly to the chase and present a particular issue for 
phenomenological consideration. I begin this chapter by 
contemplating the church as a mystery within the 
phenomenological Catholicity of Vatican II. 
By introducing the notion of Catholicity, I distinguish 
speculative language from qualitative language. Speculative 
language belongs to classical philosophy, whereas qualitative 
language belongs to phenomenological philosophy. In the 
English language nouns with the suffixes “–ism” and “–ity,” 
characterize classical and phenomenological language 
respectively. Funk and Wagnall’s Canadian College Dictionary 
defines “–ism” as a suffix attached to nouns to mean “a 
distinctive theory, doctrine, or system: usually used 
disparagingly,” and “–ity” as a suffix attached to nouns to mean 
a “state, condition, or quality.” 
The following terms, often used in discussions in philosophy 
and theology, illustrate this distinction; spiritualism vs. 
spirituality; materialism vs. materiality; personalism vs. 
personality; humanism vs. humanity; nationalism vs. nationality; 
historicism vs. historicity; Catholicism vs. Catholicity; 
individualism vs. individuality; modernism vs. modernity; 
                                                     
I use the words intend and intention, or a variation of them, in the particular 
philosophical sense introduced by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). That is to 
say that when I intend something, I am not merely planning or proposing 
something. I am also reaching out to something beyond the present moment of 
consciousness. I am pointing to a future, not yet realized, but with its roots in 
one’s present consciousness. Thus, providing this book as a possible point of 





dualism vs. duality; rationalism vs. rationality; moralism vs. 
morality; Deism vs. Deity, etc. But, it should be remembered that 
there are exceptions to this pattern. Holism is a 
phenomenological notion with no linguistic classical counterpart.  
This short book, as a product of my philosophical 
contemplation, is not a chronological history of my religious 
thought. Nor is this book intended as a catechism as conceived in 
the schools of scholastic theology. Rather, it is a philosophical 
reflection intended to clarify for the reader, as well as myself, my 
phenomenological understanding and insight into pre–Vatican II 
and Vatican II philosophical concepts in light of the notion of 
Catholicity, not of Catholicism. Any philosophical clarification 
may then be applied to theological concepts.  
As I choose to undertake my particular philosophical 
contemplation from within the church, I require membership in a 
community which is the locus of my contemplation since there is 
no philosophical insight possible in an isolated individual 
inquiry. My particular community is the Roman Catholic Church 
whose theology is currently supported by classical philosophy. 
An inquiry into the existence of the church, through the 
discipline of sociology, may provide religious knowledge of the 
culture, but I doubt that it can reveal theological meaning within 
the church. In other words, sociologists are not theologians and 
cannot access “the mind of God.” (Truthfully, I have never met a 
sociologist who has made that claim.)  
As a theologian, I have experienced the philosophical 
limitations of Catholicism as the classical understanding of the 
faith. But, I have also experienced the philosophical openness of 
Catholicity, which is the qualitative or phenomenological 
understanding of the faith. However, even though Catholicity is 
free from the objective limitations of Catholicism, it does 












Private Judgment: Catholic and Protestant 
Private judgment, as a philosophical stance within 
Christianity, had distinguished Protestant from Catholic 
theologians in pre–Vatican II times. To my mind, private 
judgment as a philosophical stance is no longer serviceable in 
distinguishing the Protestant from the Catholic theologian. 
Within an understanding of Catholicity, both Protestants and 
Catholics exercise private judgment in their theological 
interpretation. In the Victorian era, a convert to Roman 
Catholicism, George Tyrrell, (1861–1909), noted that the 
Protestant believer accepted scripture, given by God, as the 
supreme rule for belief. The Catholic believer, on the other hand,  
accepted the church as the supreme rule, given by God, for 
belief. Today, however, both Protestant and Catholic believers 
interpret the norms of their supreme authority, the scriptures or 
the church, through private judgment within their communities. 
That is to say that neither accepts their authorities without 
question. They both exercise their critical judgment. And in 
exercising critical judgment one has an opportunity for 
conversion from classical philosophy to phenomenological 
philosophy. 
It still is the case today that it is to charismatic Christianity, 
as revealed in the New Testament, and not to the church as an 
institution that the Protestant believer looks for enlightenment by 
Christ. The Catholic believer, on the other hand, continues to 
look to the institution as a charismatically gifted community for 
guidance and enlightenment by Christ. The charismatic 
Christianity evident in the New Testament era reflected the 
initial period of inspiration and enchantment in the life of the 
church. As long as the conditions of individual inspiration and 
community enchantment were effective and in force, there was 
no need to form a particular organization or government for the 
believing community to enable enlightenment by Christ. That 





inspiration and enchantment waned and the advancement of 
formal learning increased.  
The scriptures, in which the Protestant faithful find their 
institutional roots, may be studied as any historical documents in 
light of the norms of textual criticism. Textual criticism discloses 
the literary conventions of the era in which the texts were 
written. In contemplating the history of literary conventions, 
George Tyrrell noted that we do not ask if Socrates really said 
what Plato puts into his mouth. Rather, we ask: Is Plato’s 
Socrates the true Socrates? Did Christ do or say all that the 
Fourth Gospel ascribes to him? Is the Christ of the gospels the 
true Christ? I asked myself this same type of question in the 
early years of my philosophical career. I eventually concluded 
that the scriptures were not written as a chronological history and 
cannot be used as any sort of proof–text to establish Jesus’ 
divinity. 
Generally, it can be argued from the perspective of textual 
criticism that the New Testament has been consciously written to 
agree with the various Old Testament prophecies so as to present 
an ad hominem argument against the Jews for Christ’s 
Messiahship. Furthermore, science acting as an independent, 
disinterested and private judge, cannot establish the truth of the 
scriptures. Thus, it is safe to conclude that private judgment is 





Doctrine and Dogma 
I no longer hold that all that the church taught about the 
theology of dogmas, sacraments and church government was 
accepted as fully known to Peter and the apostles, who in turn 
passed that knowledge on to their successors. In light of the 
historical investigations of the theology of the church I have 
rejected this pre–Vatican II view of the church. In short, given 
my insights into Vatican II I moved towards Catholicity and 




away from Catholicism in my theological understanding of the 
church.  
To my mind, it is evident from the historical investigations of 
the late 1800’s that church government has developed from a 
loose federation of democratic communities into a highly 
centralized and hierarchical structure in which all the teaching 
authority of the church had become centralized in the pope. This 
historical transition intrigued me and further investigation into 
church history helped me clarify my theological thinking. Many 
of the Catholic theologians of the late 1800’s believed that the 
teaching authority of the church would never return to the 
ecumenical councils in which it ought to reside. At that time, 
there was a serious movement towards theological centralization. 
The schoolmen of the day equated the faith with theological 
orthodoxy and they assumed that Christ’s mission was primarily 
a theological one. They argued that the church must necessarily 
possess the same authority which Christ possessed and 
demonstrated in his teaching and miracles. I soon came to realize 
that this classical view of the church’s authority can only be 
maintained through a philosophical perspective that remains 
dependent on Hellenism. I began to wonder what a 
phenomenological understanding might reveal about the doctrine 




The Spirit of the Christ 
In accepting that the Christian revelation ceased with the 
death of the last apostle, the difference between Catholicity and 
Catholicism became a significant issue for me. I eventually 
concluded that Catholicity is primarily a way, or manner of life 
based on the example of Jesus of Nazareth. Alternatively, 
Catholicism is institutional living based on culture, which is not 
the way I prefer to interpret my life–world. Initially, George 
Tyrrell, mentioned above, experienced Catholicism as a fulfilling 
way of life which accounted for his conversion from 





merely as a truth.” 2 Eventually, however, he would discover that 
“truth” was more important than “life” to the Church of Rome.  
Catholicity does not identify a body of doctrine given to the 
church about Jesus of Nazareth. Catholicism does that. Rather, 
Catholicity enables one to engage the spirit of the Christ as 
revealed through the Church. The spirit of the Christ does not 
reveal a body of doctrine about Jesus of Nazareth. Rather, the 
spirit of the Christ reveals its own presence to one’s life–world. 
This being the case, my experience of the spirit of the Christ is 
readily susceptible to phenomenological understanding. Being 
active, the spirit of the risen Christ appropriates to its purposes 
those cultural experiences of the individual and community that 
are most suitable to establish its presence to the believer. From 
my experience, the spirit of the risen Christ uses the knowledge 
of the believer at hand to develop doctrine within the church. But 
this doctrinal development is not through propositions or 
formula. It comes via a conscious encounter with the same spirit 
that animated Jesus of Nazareth. In short, it comes via the 
enlightenment of the believer. Thus, the true teacher in the 
church is the spirit of the Christ acting immediately in and 
through the whole body of the faithful. 
Reading the works of Thomas Aquinas, (1226-1274), who 
had a charismatic gift for theology, it often seems to me that the 
benefits of his particular theological insights are lost to many 
theologians today. Unfortunately, the version of Thomistic 
understanding, which dominates the official church’s teaching 
today, often impedes the charismatic spirit that should animate 
the church’s theologians just as it did Jesus of Nazareth. History 
and experience indicate to me that the spirit of Christ can act 
outside the official Church. It is possible for me to experience 
the spirit of the Christ outside the visible church, yet not outside 
the Church of Christ itself. To my mind, a phenomenological 
philosophy can disclose the theological understanding of what 
Vatican II intended when it affirmed that the Church of Christ 
subsists in the Catholic Church (Lumen Gentium, para. 8). 
In this book, I am contemplating the church’s theology in 
light of my experience in which a Hellenized philosophy no 




longer satisfactorily meets my needs. I live in an age of societal 
and cultural changes which are occurring throughout the entire 
world. Such societal and cultural changes have philosophical and 
theological implications for me. As Western society searches for 
a better world, often without seeking, either deliberately or 
inadvertently, a better philosophical explanation of its experience 
than the one it has inherited, it needs to re–assess its 
philosophical inheritance. 
Ironically, this search for a better world has led some 
theologians to abandon not just their inherited philosophy, but 
also their faith. They become atheists with the positive intent of 
improving their lives and the lives of those around them. 
(Interestingly, it was only later in my philosophical life that I 
became aware that Christianity is the only religion to generate 
the notion of atheism.) Sincere atheists and anti–theists both 
offer a true challenge to religious believers. Louise Antony 
(2007) has edited a volume of personal essays from atheists that 
describes not only a valid alternative to religion, but also a 
fulfilling way of life, without God and apparently without the 




Human Evolution and Salvation History 
An evolutionary notion of conscious human behaviour is 
replacing the static notion of the human individual as being a 
thinking animal. Initially, this evolutionary notion of human 
behaviour presented problems within my understanding of 
philosophy and theology, since I was then of the classical mind–
set. Eventually, however, I decided that static philosophical 
notions which failed to satisfy me must be replaced by dynamic 
philosophical notions. This decision ultimately prevented me 
from accepting an atheistic point of view no matter how 
legitimate that point of view may have seemed to be to a mind 
critical of classical philosophy.  
Human society is composed of a variety of cultures that give 





higher purpose in life. From a phenomenological point of view 
this higher purpose in life originates within the material world of 
incardinated individuals and not in a transcendent and ideal 
world of disembodied spirits. From the Christian perspective, 
humanity is at the centre of earthly life, yet, humanity may 
consciously extend itself beyond its incarnated limitations and 
boundaries. Both phenomenological and classical philosophy 
demonstrate humanity’s ultimate purpose as being beyond itself. 
From within the history of the people of Israel, and I mean 
their salvation history, has evolved the theological realization of 
the church as a phenomenological mystery. In our incarnated life 
as the People of God, we have come of age philosophically and 
now inaugurate the kingdom of God through a 
phenomenological belief in the mystery of the incarnation of 
Jesus of Nazareth. The spirit of the risen Christ has called into 
being a phenomenological community on earth constituted in 
faith, hope and charity. (And He did so without intending any 
historical or political governing structure. The variety of political 
governing structures developed subsequently to His 
resurrection.) The mystery of the spirit of the risen Christ, 
phenomenologically understood, constitutes a new understanding 








Further Thoughts on My Life–World  
 
After World War I, a new Western world was born, as it 
were. However, as J. Middleton Murry (1927) notes, it was 
really not a new world but the old one clearly seen for the first 
time. It was a new world for those for whom the lines of 
demarcation were understood entirely differently from what they 
had seemed to be. This new world, at first, seemed cold, alien 
and hostile. Yet soon afterwards it appeared to have fresh hope 
as new insights were revealed and new lessons learned from a 
past and broken world. 
And this is where I am today. That is, I continue to learn new 
lessons and insights from my past and somewhat broken, 
philosophical world.  
Through a phenomenological understanding, I continue to 
discover deeper insights into the presence of God in my life–
world. I have come to realize that it is not how accurate I am in 
my understanding that is important, but rather, how authentically 
I interpret my experience. In other words, I am not seeking the 
objective truth about my experience, but rather, I am seeking an 
authentic insight into my experience in contrast to an illusion or 
fantasy. In other words, I seek what is really real. And, any 
practical interpretation I make must be made in light of the 
philosophical changes taking place in Western society. As I 
contemplate the changes in my life–world, I see that a 
phenomenological philosophy is not readily accepted by many 
individuals. Not everyone accepts that the phenomenological 
method is one that satisfies and clarifies. To some, in fact, the 
phenomenological method dissatisfies and obscures the 
understanding of their experience. Yet, in my case it was the 
opposite. Over time, I came to the conclusion that scholasticism 
had somewhat hindered my thinking through introducing a 
dichotomous structure into my philosophical understanding.  
I do realize, of course, that the defects of scholasticism are 
the defects traceable to its particular time and culture. And they 
are the defects of a philosophical language and speech that have 





even a revised form of scholasticism could not overcome these 
defects. The revised form of scholasticism to which I refer is 
neo–Thomism. Through neo–Thomism I was not able to 
satisfactorily interpret my experience. However, within a 
phenomenological understanding of my experience as a non–
dichotomous unity, I was able to satisfactorily interpret my 
experience and thereby overcome the defects of scholasticism.  
In my current situation, I contrast my present experience to 
my past experience and thus act accordingly to create my future 
of belief. Although this means that I must live within my 
inherited limitations, I need not be constrained by them. The 
truth is that I experience these cultural limitations in my life–
world whether I like it or not. I cannot avoid them. However, I 
can be engaged, even if only partially, in transcending them.  
In my life–world the interpretive task is perpetual and 
contingent. As an existential thinker, I know that there is no such 
thing as a final philosophy or theology. I conceive my work as 
different from the work of a theologian in the days when the 
great systems of the West were being constructed. As I see it, the 
task of both the contemporary religious philosopher and 
theologian is as follows. It is to make known the authenticity of 
reasoned belief in and about God to a new generation through a 
new philosophy, that is, a dehellenized philosophy. I find that the 
principle merit and usefulness of a dehellenized philosophy such 
as a phenomenological philosophy is its ability to satisfy the 
experience of the contemporary believer.  
All philosophy is culturally influenced. Unlike classical 
philosophy, phenomenological philosophy does not conform, of 
necessity, to a given system of knowledge, methodology or 
norms of interpretation. Phenomenological philosophy is a 
conscious human understanding and as a conscious human 
understanding it can utilize any methodology for the purpose of 
interpretation. Any philosophy, even of the untutored sort, can 
provide some degree of satisfaction in religious interpretation. 
History shows that natural theology, viewed by some as a 
type of philosophy and as a discipline in its own right, originated 
outside the Western Catholic ecclesiastical tradition. Natural 




theology, as a philosophy, is a proper way of inquiring into the 
world created by God rather than interpreting the revelation of 
God. St Thomas held this view, according to Schillebeeckx 
(1967). 3 As a theologian, I am required to interpret revelation 
within the sensus fidelium, that is, within the understanding of 
the faithful who constitute the church. As a social institution in 
this world, however, I believe that while the Church of Christ 
could get along without formal theologians, it could not get 




Theological Understanding within the Church 
As I see it, much theological understanding within the 
community of the church arises through the insight, not of 
ecclesiastical officials, but of faithful individuals (simplies 
fideles) interpreting their experiences. The understanding of the 
faithful has often resulted in opposition to ecclesiastical officials 
whose role is to correct and modify the formal teaching of the 
church. Arriving at theological insight is a responsibility for the 
faithful to undertake according to Auguste Sabatier (2003). In 
their task of theological interpretation, they are to seek a 
contemporary understanding with respect to God’s activity in the 
world, even if that role takes away from traditional 
understanding. If he is correct, the task of the faithful is nothing 
less than to assist in establishing new forms of theological 
interpretation within the Christian religion. He reminds his 
readers of this in Religions of Authority and the Religion of the 
Spirit.  
Theology and revelation interact with each other. As a result, 
it has been my experience that theological understanding 
develops, and continues to develop, both on an individual and 
collective basis. My personal theological meaning, as it 
develops, is meaning that is significant for everyone in the 
community of the faithful. Thus, the degree to which the 
community and I can share our respective meanings establishes 





Since I am a member of the sensus fidelium, something more 
than a mere intellectual change occurs when I interpret my 
experience. It is an existential change, a change in the 
perspective of my life–world that allows insight into the 
authentic relationship between God and me. In my 
phenomenological existential understanding, such insight is not 
achieved through a more accurate understanding of theoretical 
knowledge. Rather, achieving insight is an act of intentionality, 
that is, my reaching out to the phenomena of others in my life–
world so as to create religious as well as secular meaning in the 
practical order of life. In that reaching out to others my 
relationships are expressed existentially, and through those 
existential relationships I meet someone similar to myself. This 
may be another human being or an encounter with the presence 
of God.  
It is almost a truism that when inherited gods die, most 
people do not become atheists. Rather, they invent new gods or 
return to the pre–theoretical gods of folklore. However, these 
new gods, or the gods of folklore, do not always prove to be a 
satisfactory replacement. Similarly, when inherited philosophies 
and theologies die, most people do not stop thinking 
philosophically and theologically. They turn to new philosophies 
and theologies or re–cast pre–theoretical folk notions in 
contemporary terms. In my case, turning to the new 
phenomenological philosophy rather than the classical one led 
me to new creative insights and relationships within my life–
world. The case has been the same for my theology. 
The controversial issues in theology, those introduced by the 
new scientific knowledge of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, were discussed in North America as pastoral or 
practical issues rather than theoretical ones. The reverse was the 
case on the Continent of Europe. There was more interest in 
theory than in practice on the Continent. From my 
phenomenological perspective, I highly doubt that scholasticism 
can remain as a suitable philosophy for the majority of the 
faithful, either in North America or on the European Continent.  




The mission of the church is primarily salvific, that is, 
concerned with the saving of souls. It is only secondarily a 
mission for justice in the political and social order. In its primary 
mission, the church is not of necessity connected to any 
particular culture or philosophical system. Phenomenologically 
understood, the church transcends the temporal history of the 
People of God yet paradoxically, the church is mysteriously 
incarnated in its salvation history.  
In its nature and mission the church is philosophically and 
theologically universal. Hence, in its universality it can function 
as a bond among communities of peoples as well as nations, 
provided these peoples and nations recognize and trust the 
church. It follows that these peoples and nations must guarantee 
the freedom of the church, allowing it to carry out its mission, 
according to Flannery, (1996). In a phenomenological 
understanding of the church, the priesthood of the faithful and 
the hierarchical priesthood, while distinguishable, are 
functionally and organically integrated. However, in the 
Hellenistic perspective these priestly offices differ ontologically. 
That is, they differ in their essence and being, and each is a 





In the contemporary theological climate, there is an interest 
in the individual as a person from a psychological point of view. 
Diramuid O’Murchu, (2000), a noted Catholic author in 
psychology, seems to have had an experience similar to that of 
George Tyrrell, whose psychological understanding reflects a 
model of the psychological development of the person. Tyrrell’s 
model of the psychological development of the person is in 
contrast to the clinical model of psychological development 
which often addresses pathological issues of personality. 
O’Murchu has written from a non–pathological perspective that 
his personal faith journey included many conscious transitions in 





previously conceived as unalterable or, according to official 
teaching, could never change and therefore should never be 
abandoned. Similarly, when I give meaning to my experience, I 
am not doing so merely as a person living in God’s creation as a 
product of creation but also as an active agent, a co–creator with 
God and living in God’s (our) creation. Obviously, I do not mean 
physical creation only. In giving meaning to my experience, I 
create my life–world one which exists independently of physical 
creation and which has its own standards of moral existence. 
My ability to revise the meaning of my life–world as new 
data becomes available is possible because I am open to that 
which is transcendent. Being open to that which is transcendent 
connects me to the Other beyond myself. And I recognize that 
this connection adds a spiritual dimension to my life which is not 
mere metaphysics, and that I cannot separate my spirituality 





For any serious dialogue to bear fruit today in the life of the 
faithful, it must engage their personal and existential creative 
experience as well as their quantitative and qualitative 
understanding. At one point in the process of evaluating my 
inherited understanding, I related the thought of George Tyrrell 
to that of Leslie Dewart. I then compared their thoughts with my 
own classical understanding of that time. I have continued the 
task of comparing the thought of Tyrrell and Dewart to my own 
which still discloses fresh insights within my philosophical and 
theological thought. Given my own experience, I find it is 
unfortunate that, at this time in the development of Western 
philosophy and theology, the place of philosophy in relation to 
theology seems to have been usurped to a great extent by 
sociology and psychology. It is my hope that those readers who 
may not be philosophically inclined, but who gravitate to 
sociology and psychology, will discover new insights should 
they persevere with this book. 




In the public forum today, theological and spiritual ideas are 
often perceived as needless. While in the private forum these 
may be accepted as necessary, phenomenological thinking 
distinguishes itself by serving as a means to disclose the proper 
origin of theological and spiritual ideas, whether private or 
public.  
I detect that a shift away from the old style of competitive 
theological polemics towards a new style of ecumenical 
cooperation is taking place among contemporary theologians. 
For these thinkers, Western theology, which traditionally has 
been supported by classical philosophy, has shifted to a 
discursive theology which is often interpreted through 
phenomenological philosophy. It was within this context of a 
discursive theology that I began to make sense of my personal, 
though not necessarily private, experience. And in making sense 
of my experience, I found that I had to undertake a 
phenomenological approach to tell my personal story. Many 
theologians have had their stories to tell, including that of the 
convert George Tyrrell. In his day, and within his particular 
intellectual climate, George Tyrrell attempted to understand his 
religious experience through his philosophical contemplation of 
God’s revelation. 
As a theologian, the revelation of God is a particular focus in 
my life. My theological preoccupation has its roots in the Roman 
Catholic theological views that were in vogue in the early 20th 
century, particularly that of the Nouvelle Théologie. Ahead of his 
time, George Tyrrell’s way of thinking reflected an ecumenical 
model of theologizing rather than the conventional polemical 
model of theologizing that was dominant in his day. It was 
through his model of theologizing that I found the beginnings of 
fresh insights into my faith.  
One intention in this book is to draw the reader’s attention to 
the fact that many creative and insightful contributions from 
theologians are often quoted and discussed by academics and 
other professionals. These academic reviewers and professionals 
often truly believe they have understood, and correctly 





theological thinkers. And in most cases, they probably have done 
so, but not always. George Tyrrell’s story of creative and 
innovative theologizing is a case in point. The appreciation of his 
style of creative and innovative thinking is not as well 
recognized as it could be among professional theologians. The 
majority of academics discuss Tyrrell from an historical 
perspective, often within the (so–called) Modernist Crisis in the 
Roman Catholic Church. The extensive bibliographies compiled 
by M. J. Weaver (1981) and D. Wells (1981) in their books 
support my claim. However, David Schultenover, (1981), a critic 
of Tyrrell, focused on a different understanding rather than the 
conventional historical one. Schultenover wrote of Tyrrell’s way 
of thinking that it is an intellectual history which is to be 
distinguished from a social history. Schultenover aimed to 
describe, not the Modernist Movement, but the intellectual 
development of a major contributor to that movement by 
focusing on the man and his thought.  
Two modern developments are crucial in giving some 
rationale for the creative tensions that exist within the Western 
philosophical and theological traditions. The first is that 
medieval Christendom has come to an end and secularism exists 
in its wake. The other development is that a psychological 
understanding of the person has taken the place of the scholastic 
understanding of the person. If speaking of God really means 
that I am at the same time saying something about myself, then 
talking about God in categories that belong to an earlier cultural 
age simply cannot satisfy me. 
One of the criticisms of Modernity is that it sets up a false 
confidence in rationalism and science. Given their ability to 
categorize and explain human experience rationalism and 
science, are often portrayed as being able to convey the totality 
of one’s experience. Once I realized that this could not be the 
case, that neither could convey the totality of my experience, I 
undertook a phenomenological approach which directed me 
away from the dichotomous understanding contained in 
rationalism and science. The phenomenological approach 
permitted me to undertake a non–dichotomous, active 




engagement with my life–world in determining the future of my 
belief. In light of that engagement, I am of the belief that science 
poses a problem primarily for my philosophical interpretation of 
my life–world and only secondarily a problem for the 
interpretation of my faith — if at all.  
The sociological entity in which I experience my spirituality 
is the church. Exploring all the various understandings of the 
church is a specialized discipline within theology called 
ecclesiology. The differing interpretations of the scriptural texts 
by the various denominations, plus the political, philosophical, 
and historical reform movements among the faithful have all 
contributed to a diverse self–understanding of the church. From a 
phenomenological philosophical perspective, the church is not a 
social arrangement imposed on the faithful. Rather, the church is 
disclosed as a communion of communities constituted by the 
faithful, each with its own self–understanding, history, culture 
and tradition.  
There is a variety of expression in the church reflecting a 
variety of local cultures. In this regard, my contention for many 
years has been that the theological problems of the churches, 
within their varying local cultures, are first philosophical 
problems and need to be addressed as such. Afterwards come the 
theological solutions to the problems of interpretation of God’s 
presence in the world. As I indicated earlier, I began forming this 
view during my undergraduate years when I studied philosophy 
and was introduced to the theological perspective of George 
Tyrrell, (1861–1909). Further, the philosophical insights of one 
of my professors at St Michael’s College, University of Toronto, 
(Leslie Dewart, 1922–2009), motivated me significantly in 
consciously forming my convictions. It was Leslie Dewart’s 
understanding of “dehellenization,” a philosophical concept 
which he did not present as a negative concept meaning 
“unhellenization,” that provided an opportunity for me to begin 
to evaluate my inherited classical understanding. 
Contemporary theologians, those who theologize formally on 
behalf of a believing community, are required to think as 





culture was not oriented to professionalism but to 
authoritarianism. The hierarchical order is the required form of 
any authoritarian organization structured for absolute rule and 
governance. Contemporary society and modern religious 
organizations are oriented toward professionalism, democracy 
and the principle of personal creativity. Within the churches of 
the Reformation, democratic governance is clearly evident. For 
the hierarchical churches, both Catholic and Orthodox, the 
principle of subsidiarity fulfills the intent of democratic 
governance. 
My philosophical contemplation suggests to me, at least, that 
a phenomenologically understood church reveals a new 
ecclesiology that is based upon relationships among the faithful, 
not on an order of political government. Based on relationships, 
government becomes governance. Present day churches, in the 
Catholic and Orthodox traditions, are based on the notion of 
territorial jurisdiction. However, there is an option for the future 
governance of the church through an organic ecclesiology, one 
not merely territorially re–ordered, but one that is reconstituted 
phenomenologically. To my mind, such an ecclesial 
reconstitution requires, on a continual basis, that I reappraise the 
development of my Christian theology. This is so because I am 
living in a culture that has not been envisioned or brought about 
only by one factor. My present culture is determined by many 
factors. Among them are physical, metaphysical, mental, human, 
and divine causes. Indeed, my present culture may even be over–
determined by a combination of these and other factors. By 
“over–determined” I mean no one factor can be held responsible 
for the direction of the cultural development of the world in 
which I encounter the presence of God. I take this to mean that, 
in truth, God is not solely responsible for everything that 
happens to me, or happens in the cosmos for that matter.  
That is to say that I have a responsible role in the 
interpretation of God’s revelation. This responsibility allows me 
to conceive of myself as a responsible co–agent in, and as a 
responsible co–creator of my society and culture. With this 
status, I am able to work towards building the kingdom of God 




on earth in light of a faithful interpretation of the revealed 
presence of God. Thus, the Kingdom of God is not to be 
politically understood as in the classical sense. Rather, it is to be 
existentially understood from a phenomenological perspective. 
My co–participation in the divine creativity is the risk that God 
has taken with me. I am conscious that this risk anticipates 
possible failure. There is a prophetic remark, attributed to Alfred 
Loisy, (1857–1940), about such failure: “Jésus annonçait le 
Royaume et c’est l’ glise qui est venue.” (Jesus came 
proclaiming the Kingdom and what arrived was the Church.) 4 
The Catholic institutional understanding of the church is as 
old as the first epistle of St Clement, (circa 75–110), in which the 
church is conceived as a divine institution. According to St. 
Clement, the church is an institution with officers whose duty is 
determined by an official status within the institution. In this 
understanding, the officers of the church are analogous to 
officers of the state. To my mind, Jesus of Nazareth would never 
contemplate endorsing any form of church government patterned 
on a model whose leaders were analogous to the state. It is clear 
that the apostles believed that the end of the world would occur 
within their lifetime, yet they made no provision for an 
institutional church as we know it today. The spirit that animates 
the church today is the same spirit that animated Jesus of 
Nazareth. In my experience, this same spirit reveals an 
understanding of Catholicity, not Catholicism, in the church 
today.  
As a person with an indeterminate future, I am also an 
individual being who desires to evolve beyond my present self. 
However, if I, as a Christian, look at the world and understand it 
through Hellenistic eyes, I will find it necessary to look to the 
past and not beyond myself to find the meaning of my 
experience. In looking to the past through Hellenistic eyes I am 
tempted to permit the power of God to govern me. If I do permit 
the power of God to govern me, I remain a creature with no 
opportunity to evolve to a co–creator status. However, if I see the 
world phenomenologically, I look to the present and future 





wherein God and I cooperate in both my present and future life, 
given my status as a co–creator with personal self–governance. 
Given my phenomenological understanding, the transcendent 
God beyond me does not have absolute power over me in the 
classical sense. Rather, God’s power is shared with me in my 
status as a co–creator. The fundamental relationship between 
God and me does not consist of a hierarchical relationship of 
power. It consists, rather, in a relationship of mutual presence in 
a conscious unity within my life–world, wherein I have become a 
co–creator, sharing in the divine power in creating the future of 
my belief. Thus, as I dehellenize my belief, I recast the meaning 
of my faith in terms that do not imply God’s absolute power over 
me. 
Contemporary theologians, both Eastern and Western, are 
beginning to realize that the present structure of church 
government which reflects classical theism must change. The 
present governing structure of the church is based on a territorial 
notion and not on a gift of God’s grace or on divine charism. A 
territorial notion is an obstacle to the ecclesial governance of the 
church today. Note that I say “ecclesial governance,” not 
“ecclesiastical government.” And, as such, it will continue to be 
an obstacle in the future. Such territorial notions often do not 
conform to one’s lived, that is, one’s existential social condition, 
or life–world. Mine included. Further, it would be a theological 
error to promote the idea of a universal territorial super–church 
composed of all the faithful based merely on the philosophical 
notion of human political expediency. 
It must be remembered that while individual humans do 
exist, a universal humanity does not. Furthermore, humanity as 
an abstract notion, is expressed through a variety of 
philosophical, political and cultural patterns. God is conceived as 
immanently present or absent in these philosophical and cultural 
patterns. When I conceive God as immanently present, I relate to 
others within my life–world so as to disclose a new and 
meaningful philosophical understanding which replaces the old 
one. New wineskins for new wine, as it were.  




Victor Segesvary, (2003) reminds us that humanity, 
understood as an existential community of individuals, is too 
large an entity to be the bearer of a single shared culture. In this 
respect, the contemporary world is not that different from the 
world of the ancient cultures. It is, however, urgent that I find 
creative ways to interpret what is unique in the experience of my 
present life–world.  
In returning to the sources of my faith, it is more responsible 
for me to promote a reasoned phenomenological philosophy 
rather than retain a culture of folklore in which to interpret my 
experience.  
Psychology, sociology, history, anthropology, etc., contribute 
to my interpretive task, to some degree, but it is only philosophy 
that is in a privileged position to support my theological 
reflection. As a contemporary theologian, my task is not to look 
for an opportunity to prove through polemics a doctrinal point of 
view. Rather, my task is to express, to clarify and deepen my 





Having come to appreciate the influence of Leslie Dewart in 
my academic career, my intention as indicated earlier, is to 
provide for the reader a reflective account of the development of 
my own philosophical thinking from my undergraduate years to 
the writing of this book. I have deliberately and consciously 
undertaken this reflective account. My motivation is to offer this 
reflection in the public forum because there may be other 
theologians or philosophers contemplating doing the same and 
may be interested in knowing of my experience. I present this 
reflection not as a chronological or historical sequence of events 
detailing the stages of my philosophical development. Rather, I 
invite the reader to revisit and reconsider his or her own thinking 
in the context of philosophical development. Thus, identifying 
dates and occasions marking the various philosophical 





began believing “this,” is not my intent here. Rather, I consider 
those occasions when a series of conscious realizations 
converged in my thinking which presented a phenomenological 
moment of insight that changed what I believed. My personal 
understanding of philosophy, which is sympathetic to that of 
Plato and Plotinus, is that philosophy is an intellectual and 
contemplative activity. Furthermore, this intellectual and 
contemplative activity relates me to my environment from which 
I differentiated myself. This intellectual and contemplative 
activity has provided insights that have allowed me to organize 
and re–organize my theological understanding on a continuing 
basis.  
Like many other students of philosophy throughout history, I 
began my questioning during my undergraduate years while 
studying classical philosophy which I later came to reject. 
During these years, however, there was not an immediate and 
total rejection of classical philosophy. In practice, I took what 
“worked” from classical philosophy and rejected what was 
irrelevant to my experience at that time. Today, unlike my 
undergraduate years, any rejection of what is irrelevant in my 
philosophy is more thoroughly thought out. What is relevant is 
consciously maintained. Over time, I have come to agree with 
Christopher Macann (1997), from a philosophical perspective, it 
is not that phenomena reveal or disclose being or even what it 
means “to be.” Rather, the opposite is the case. Being, or what it 
means “to be” discloses or reveals phenomena. I no longer 
consider the legacy of Hellenistic philosophy as the necessary 
philosophical substrate common to all human thinking and 
experience. I once thought that to be the case, however. Now, I 
recognize that classical Hellenistic philosophy is only one point 
of view within an evolutionary process of philosophical 
traditions that constitutes human thinking. 
Like many philosophers in the Catholic tradition I sought 
contact with, or knowledge of a metaphysical reality, that is, God 
through transcendental philosophy. At one time, Neo–Thomism 
seemed to satisfy my quest. In the initial years of my 
philosophical thinking, I accepted uncritically that what was 




truly real was enclosed a priori in formal ideological structures, 
that is, my experience was best understood as interpreted through 
Platonic idealism. I later came to realize that my experience 
neither revealed nor confirmed that such structures even existed. 
I had presumed them to be there. Eventually, and largely due to 
Leslie Dewart’s philosophical influence, I accepted that there are 
no a priori structures to reality. Thus, I abandoned classical 
understanding and undertook a critical self–reflection on my 
experience.  
My critical self–reflection opened up a new perspective, 
enabling me to understand and make sense of my experience. It 
was my arrival at this stage of critical self–reflection, according 
to Stöckl (2007), that marks the moment I consciously entered 
modernity. The notion of modernity, as a philosophical concept, 
refers to the experience of modernization and to the critical 
reflection upon this experience. Modernity, then, was the context 
in which I found myself engaged in the task of having to make 
sense of my experience. Once I understood this, I came to 
question seriously whether or not the scholastic philosophical 
idealism that I inherited from my Western culture did exist 
independently of my consciousness. I concluded that it did not. 
Rather, it is more accurate to say that I intentionally construct 
my ideas, or notions, through a conscious awareness of 
relationships with the world around me. 
In my reflections, I note that I am able to distinguish between 
my being and my becoming, yet I am not able to separate my 
being from my becoming. They are, in my experience, one and 
the same. As well, I am conscious that my being and my 
becoming constitute a unity which leads me to understand them 
as equi–primordial. That is to say, from a dehellenized point of 














Within philosophy there are two sets of terms not to be 
confused. The terms “subjectivity” and “objectivity,” are not to 
be confused with the terms “subjectivism” and “objectivism.” 
They are not interchangeable. The former are phenomenological, 
that is, qualitative terms. The latter are scholastic, that is, 
quantitative terms.  
Platonic, and some neo–platonic philosophers continue to 
subscribe to ideal forms in interpreting sense experience. Yet, 
they do not admit of any reality to the relationships among these 
ideal forms. This understanding is not consistent with a 
phenomenological perspective. As a phenomenologist, I admit to 
an existential relationship among entities since I see no reason to 
continue to hold to the existence of platonic material forms. That 
is to say, reality is relational rather than ideal in the classical 
philosophical sense. I have adopted this position because my 
conscious awareness does not analyze being and consequently 
discover a framework of material forms. My conscious 
awareness recognizes that all entities, be they living or non–
living, are related among themselves.  
Being conscious, I differentiate in my relationships between 
that which is “me” and that which is “not me.” I am aware of my 
conscious self, that is, “me,” as manifested through my body yet 
differing from my body. I am also aware of “me” as 
differentiated from other physical and non–physical entities. In 
short, I am not my body. Neither am I a spirit or non–physical 
entity separate from my body. Rather, as a human being I 
experience myself to be an incarnated entity in relationship with 
other entities, be they incarnated or not. By incarnated, I mean 
that I am an “in-the-flesh” living entity possessing a soul. 
Whether this soul is immortal or not is another matter that does 
not concern me here. As a human incarnation, I exist in such a 
way that I can relate myself to myself as well as to others. As a 
human incarnation, I do not experience myself as a dichotomized 
being, united through a joining of a body and a soul originally 




separate, but rather, I experience myself as an individuated 
being, originally unified, or constituted as body and soul, capable 
of being present to others as “me.” 
In my dehellenized understanding, I have recognized three 
unique moments of insight, or moments of conscious realizations 
within myself. They are: 1) the realization of my capacity for 
reflexive thinking, 2) the realization of my individuality that I am 
“this” and not “that,” and 3) the realization of my personal 
integration. And I continue to become more deeply aware of the 
legacy of these moments as my conscious understanding 
deepens.  
My relationships are realized through a conscious 
differentiation in my experience in which I distinguish between 
“me” and “not me,” and not through any a priori determination 
imported from outside of my experience, that is, from any pre–
determined idealism. Through my relationships, I am conscious 
that I exist, not only for myself, but also for others. It is within 
my relationships with others that my self–disclosure occurs. In 
this self–disclosure, I become aware of myself as an individual. 
As an individual, I am able to place myself in an appropriate 
relationship with my environment, and other living beings, of 
whom I have become conscious and from whom I am 
differentiated. 
I, as a person, do not have the structure of an object. Rather, I 
am a person constituted as being greater than the sum of my 
individual parts. That is, I am holistically constituted as an 
incarnated individual person. The fact is that I am devoid of any 
fixed or final human construction, but not devoid of being 
perpetually constituted as human as long as I am alive. Human 
construction is a metaphysical concept, whereas, being 
constituted as human is an organic concept. It is through my 
organic constitution that I am able to determine an appropriate 
relationship with my environment and the universe from which I 
have consciously differentiated myself.  
Through this process of differentiation, I become conscious 
of the temporal and the transcendental aspects of my existence 





person, I am constituted as a unity and not as a union, of 
immanence and transcendence which makes me who I am.  
 
  




The Dehellenization of the Future of My Belief and Other 
Topics 
 
I undertake the organization of the future of my belief from 
within a dehellenized understanding. A dehellenized 
understanding is not a fixed understanding It is a process of the 
deliberate re–evaluation of experience that is perpetually 
undergoing development and re–constitution. It is a dynamic 
process. The dehellenization process helped me to recognize that 
my Christian and secular experience had been, for a time, the 
same. I had no need to distinguish between them. It was easy, 
therefore, for me to think that to be a Christian meant accepting 
uncritically the Western social and cultural order that I inherited. 
It took some time for me to realize that my social and cultural 
order was, in fact, the legacy of a Hellenized philosophical 
tradition. 
Reading the works of some contemporary Western 
philosophers, I realized that this Hellenized philosophical 
inheritance was a serious commitment on their part. When they 
realized that the Hellenized philosophical and cultural 
inheritance was undergoing critical assessment, they often wrote 
rebuttals in favour of the classical approach. Realizing their bias, 
I ceased to follow their lead and rejected their efforts at rebuttal 
and sought instead to review critically my experience and 
develop a dehellenized approach to my philosophical thinking.  
Engaging the Catholic philosophical language at the time of 
Vatican II, I favored ressourcement over aggiornamento. I 
favoured a return to Western philosophical sources, the result of 
which was not merely the updating of philosophical language. It 
brought philosophical language into conformity with modern 
usage 5 In light of Vatican II, as a philosopher and theologian 
experiencing the end of a classical philosophical age, I pondered 
what was to be my philosophical role in any new understanding 
arising out of my Christian and secular experience. My 
conclusion was that only a return to, and critique of the sources 
of Western philosophical thinking could provide a satisfactory 





The cultural and social contexts in which I live are organized 
on the basis of a collective interpretation of the experiences of 
my community and myself. In the contemporary Western 
context, such organization is occurring slowly and I have 
realized that I am among those Christians who call for a 
collective interpretation based on experience. However, I am not 
taken seriously by many of my contemporaries. If I am taken 
seriously by some, I am not heeded by others. Their lack of 
interest, I believe, is due to their philosophical bias which 
favours an a priori belief pattern which they have retained from 
a Hellenized philosophical perspective.  
In my philosophical contemplation, I soon realized that if 
answers to my questions were given to me beforehand by well–
meaning, authoritative predecessors, there was no need for me to 
undertake any personal critical investigation with respect either 
to my experience or the accuracy of their authoritative answers. I 
could have remained philosophically passive and accept 
uncritically their ideas. But, I soon realized, that rather than 
simply accept my intellectual inheritance without question, I 
needed to accept my own intellectual responsibility and become 
an agent for change within myself and then within my 
environment. Thus, my problem became not just how to update 
my past understanding but, more significantly, how to plan for 
the future of my belief free from a Hellenized philosophy. I 
concluded that I could only plan for a future that was not a 
repetition, or variation, of my past experience and way of 
thinking through a methodology, one not dependent on a 





In reflecting phenomenologically upon my experience, I have 
come to understand that Christianity is not an abstraction. Nor is 
it an ideology. Upon abandoning these understandings, I began 
to express my Christian belief phenomenologically through 




relationships within the culture reflected in my community of 
faith.  
The faith community in which I live is an historical reality, 
not only in the social, psychological and natural sense, but also 
in the transcendent, spiritual, and supernatural sense. I must 
explain this. To believe in the Judeo–Christian revelation is to 
believe that my existence is influenced by certain events 
involving God’s activity in the world. Even though I am 
conscious of God’s activity, immanently and transcendentally in 
my experience of being and becoming, what I have found to be 
very significant is the realization that all my experiences could 
have been other than what they were. I was not fully aware of the 
implications of this insight until I was exposed to Leslie 
Dewart’s thinking on the same subject.  
Prior to this stage of my philosophical development, I had 
not managed to formulate a satisfying approach to the integration 
of Hellenic philosophical concepts into my experience. I think 
that part of the reason for this failure was due to the fact that 
Hellenistic cultural concepts were not merely unsatisfactory in 
interpreting my experience, but they were also foreign to my 
experience. In other words, my experience was not culturally 
Hellenistic. The philosophical and theological questions raised 
within my ordinary experience had little in common with the 
Hellenistic cultural and philosophical understanding which was 
beginning to be characterized as an age that no longer existed. 
Eventually, as I recognized that an alternative approach was 
needed, the question became one of interpreting, through 
satisfactory and contemporary concepts, my daily experience of 
the presence of God in my life–world. 
The question of a satisfactory and contemporary 
interpretation replacing these waning Hellenistic cultural 
concepts is an existential, not theoretical question. In fact, within 
my new insight of existential understanding, contemplation did 
yield satisfactory results. One result was that I was free from the 
burdensome and inordinate influence of Hellenistic philosophy 
which had once been dominant in my life. In my earlier years, I 





understanding, was somehow determined by pre–existing ideals. 
Today, however, my philosophical contemplation reveals that 
culture is as indeterminate in its organization as are the 
individuals who create the culture. Culture is neither an 
abstraction, nor a fixed ideology. It is a dynamic human activity 
reflecting my existence. It was through a phenomenological 
understanding that I was able to understand my culture as 
evolutionary. That is, as being evolutionary in the way human 





There are certain cultural constraints that determine my 
choices. Necessity, however, is not one of them. Events can be 
other than they are. Yet, even within the limiting conditions of 
my life–world, I have the capacity to make it other than it is. If 
my theological construction has any meaning and Christian value 
for me and my community, it is because I am trying to work out 
a proper relationship in order to live in responsible freedom. 
Responsible freedom is not license to do or believe whatever I 
desire. Responsible freedom is the freedom through which I 
respond to others and all that is real, which, in fact, limits me. 
Further, living within responsible freedom, I believe that I am to 
live in a philosophically contemplative manner which includes 
responding critically to the supernatural vocation to which God 
calls me. I try to respond creatively and faithfully to this call 
albeit in a dehellenized manner. 
I have noticed that when Hellenistic philosophers claim to 
live in responsible freedom they often presuppose the role of 
fate. On the contrary, I am a believer not in fate, but in creative 
freedom. When, in creative freedom, I contemplate what I should 
do in organizing my future, I intend to include an understanding 
of what does not yet exist or is not yet present in my 
understanding. That is, I allow for the possibility of future 
alternatives to which God may be calling me. I incorporate the 
vision or insight that God reveals to me within the 




phenomenological understanding of my life–world. In short, I 
allow for the notion of an “open” future as opposed to a “closed” 
future in my life–world.  
As a free agent, I am able to contemplate philosophical issues 
before acting on them. Thus, I am truly responsible for my 
conduct. No one else is. There is no group or individual who can 
cancel out my freedom. I can, however, surrender my freedom. 
But in surrendering my freedom, I would become dehumanized, 
that is, I would act like a robot. My free choices arise out of a 
creative capacity which is uniquely a human power. I cannot, 
therefore, surrender governing myself reasonably and 
autonomously and still remain human. As human, I am a 
creatively constituted person in body and spirit. In my creative 
freedom, I do not undertake efforts, as did Plato and Aristotle, to 
conform to an ideal order of reality. In other words, through my 
philosophical contemplation, I have come to realize that I freely 
organize my future of belief as an incardinated, individuated and 





From early Hellenic to modern times, various philosophical 
traditions have asserted that human beings are merely thinking 
animals. Yet, I find that in my philosophical contemplation, I 
exhibit a peculiar and unique ability that I do not share with non–
human animals. I am constituted differently. I am a being who is 
capable of understanding myself to be uniquely present to 
myself. The real difference between non–human animals and me 
is not that I possess a higher degree of knowledge. The real 
difference between non–human animals and me is that I am able 
to reflect upon myself and know that I am reflecting upon 
myself. If I ask: does the fish know it is a fish and the cat know it 
is a cat, etc., the answer is that I have no reason to believe that 
they do. 
As my consciousness develops I am aware of a deepening of 





the knowledge of myself as a reflecting agent ultimately reveals 
the presence of a transcendental reality, that is, the presence of 
God in whose image and likeness I am made. As well, a 
deepening of the knowledge of myself reveals a deepening of the 
knowledge of God. In short, the deeper my self–knowledge, the 
deeper my knowledge of God. 
What is unique and distinctive about my transcendental 
knowledge, as compared to my temporal knowledge, is that my 
transcendental knowledge takes the form of a qualitative as 
opposed to a quantitative understanding. My temporal 
understanding occurs within a quantitative experience. That is to 
say, my experience is in time. As well, given that my 
transcendental knowledge of God develops qualitatively, I 
become more aware of that of which I am already conscious, 
even if in an underdeveloped or imperfect manner. 
My transcendental knowledge is an awareness of that which 
is real, which is outside time and does exist, but not as any form 
of being which is within time. As my consciousness of 
transcendental knowledge increases I realize, that is, I make real 
that which had always been present to me and which I have 
come to understand in a new light. Thus, in my transcendental 
knowledge, I recognize a sharper, clearer, and nobler meaning to 
my life in the presence of God. This new meaning is not the once 
hidden, pre–existing meaning now revealed. Rather, this new 
meaning has evolved out of an earlier meaning that I had 
incorporated unsatisfactorily into my life from my Hellenic 
inheritance. As it happens, I experience my transcendental 
consciousness as part of the continuum of my temporal self–
knowledge that perpetually evolves and discloses itself as the 
presence of God.  
To know a thing better, in traditional Western philosophy, 
often means to know more about the same thing. That is, 
knowledge is conceived quantitatively, not qualitatively. Such 
understanding became problematic for me when I understood 
that at the closing of revelation, after the end of the New 
Testament era, it meant that the Christian religion could not 
reveal any new truths. It meant that revelation could only 




increase through the multiplication and variation of concepts 
about the faith that were somehow already known. However, this 
understanding was not in keeping with my experience. I did not 
experience God’s self–revelation in Jesus of Nazareth as limited 
to the various conceptions about the faith in a closed system of 
revelation. I had no sense of being restricted to knowing only an 
historical record of past revelation that had occurred and been 
completed in the past. On the contrary, I have experienced and 
continue to experience the living, open–ended revealing presence 
of God in my daily life. 
Naturally, my theological understanding occurs within the 
experience of my particular religion. Further, my Christian 
theological organization is reflective of my belief. I have a 
personal history which distinguishes me from both other 
Christians and non–Christians and their personal histories, even 
though we all are made in the image and likeness of God. 
As I mentioned earlier, I was not satisfied within the Hellenic 
approach to understanding the transcendent reality within my 
life–world. I am satisfied, however, with my conscious and 
continuing attempts at self–differentiation within that reality in 
which I was originally constituted as a unity, but not as a union. 
My self–differentiation within that reality continues as an active 
process whereby my unique identity emerges and is present to 
others as well as myself. Thus, I continue to conceive of my 
identity through that ability for self–differentiation which 
distinguishes me from other sentient beings. For me, to be a 
person, is to know myself in God’s presence and to know that I 
know my presence to God. My personality is a manifestation of 
my unique self at any given stage of my conscious growth in my 
life–world. Further, I experience myself as an entity who desires 













My Awareness of God 
I accept as historically accurate that the Hellenization of 
Christianity was the outcome of a gradual transformation of 
earlier cultural forms into later ones. Thus, Hellenism is not the 
cultural form of the world today. It was, however, the cultural 
form of the ecumenical world of the apostolic and patristic ages. 
Throughout the apostolic and patristic ages, it was practically 
impossible to distinguish between the universalization of 
Christianity and its Hellenization of Christianity. Contrary to the 
Hebraic philosophical perspective in which God is a presence of 
one kind among other kinds, from the Hellenist philosophical 
perspective, God is a transcendent being. Within my 
phenomenological understanding, one which is conducive to the 
Hebraic approach, God is that reality in and from which my 
being comes “to be.” In other words, my unique life is a 
differentiated, or more accurately, an individuated life, coming–
into–being and manifested through a relationship to God who is 
present to me. In the early stages of my philosophical career, I 
had accepted that there was truly a separation or a dichotomy 
between the essence and the existence of an entity, including 
God. I now entertain another understanding based on my 
experience, one which is not in accord with my previous 
Hellenistic understanding. As an existential thinker, my belief is 
grounded directly upon the experience of the presence of God 
and not upon ideas or concepts about God. That is to say, ideas 
or concepts about God do not confirm my belief in the presence 
of God. Rather, my experience is that my consciousness directly 
confirms the reality of God who is not a being among other 
beings but yet is present to me.  
This knowledge of God as being present to me, however, 
does not result in a union of me and God. Rather, my knowledge 
of the presence of God comes about through my differentiation 
from and individuation in that reality – God. Paradoxically, God 
is “not me,” yet there is that of God in me. Differentiation is a 
process in which my existence within time means that I must 




consciously create myself, that is, differentiate myself within and 
from the reality – God. The reality – God, which is beyond the 
physical, is revealed to me as an intangible presence through the 
process of differentiation. The fact is that through the process of 
differentiation, I am conscious of being in the presence of reality 
such that when this reality is felt by me, I am more authentically 
fulfilled than I would be were I not conscious of it.  
I experience my individuality through a holistic 
consciousness. That is, I am conscious that I am more than the 
sum of my individual parts. A holistic consciousness does not 
burden me with having to prove that there is actually a God. 
Rather, I am preoccupied with understanding how the reality, 
God, is authentically present within my consciousness and 
reciprocally how I, in my reality, am present to God. My 
preoccupation is with the presence of God, not with God’s 
existence. Thus, through a holistic understanding, what I realize 
or make real in my life–world is God’s presence to me rather 
than God’s existence. It is truly the presence of God that makes 
me greater than the sum of my parts. 
It is to be remembered that the phenomenological presence of 
God is not the ideal presence of God as understood in Hellenistic 
metaphysics. If I look at the world and understand it through 
Hellenic eyes, I will find it necessary to concede God’s power 
over me and possibly against me. Through experience, however, 
I am conscious that God does not have power over me in any 
negative sense. I am conscious, as well, that the fundamental 
relationship that exists between me and God renders us present 
to each other. This, I believe, is a true conscious insight 
realizable to all human beings. In my daily life, as I dehellenize 
my Christian belief, I recast the meaning of my faith in terms 
that do not imply God’s dominance over me. 
In accepting Hellenistic philosophy, I had agreed to God’s 
dominance over me through trying to do his will. In my 
dehellenized understanding, however, the perception of a 
supernatural, transcendental being dominant over me is not an 





Christian faith is the conception of the presence of God to me as 
gift. In other words, the presence of the giver is the gift.  
As Western philosophy departs more and more from its 
Hellenic roots, the concept of inherited supernaturalism loses its 
usefulness for contemporary philosophy. However, mainstream 
Catholic philosophy has remained supportive of its inherited 
supernaturalism and is rather unsympathetic to any immanent 
spirituality phenomenologically understood.  
I have become aware of an alternative stance to the scholastic 
view that grace builds upon my human nature. The alternative 
stance is that my human nature develops in the presence of God 
because that is how I, as human, have been constituted — to 





Concerning dehellenization and belief, one question that I 
have asked myself is whether or not I consciously undertake to 
critically construct the future of my belief or, do I choose to 
remain satisfied with a pre–critical understanding? This is the 
question I now address. In my phenomenological philosophical 
contemplation, I consider issues from a meta–metaphysical 
perspective. That is, having rejected traditional Hellenistic 
understanding and having accepted a phenomenological 
philosophical perspective, I have transcended Hellenistic 
metaphysical understanding. That is to say that 
phenomenological understanding does not contain any variation 
of a classical metaphysical understanding. Rather, 
phenomenological understanding addresses the existential 
phenomena of one’s life–world, not the idealism of a speculative 
philosophy. Thus, in phenomenological philosophical 
understanding, the real problem is not whether the world will 
change or whether it will remain the same. The real problem is 
whether the world will change of its own accord, without my 
participation, or whether it will be changed deliberately, 
consciously and with my participation. 




I participate existentially in changing my world through 
relationships understood phenomenologically. These 
relationships define the limits of my life–world and my 
participation within reality. While there is no possibility of 
returning to the fixed nature of the past, the shaping of my future 
of belief does require an analysis of the circumstances of the past 
without a re–living of them. In analyzing my past, I am 
conscious of myself, not as a static being, but as an active free 
agent in the presence of other active free agents, including God. 
In organizing the future of my belief, I have chosen neither a 
traditional nor any updated philosophical perspective such as 
Neo–Thomism. It was through learning to define myself in terms 
of phenomenological philosophy that I came to appreciate the 
rationale of the process I was using to construct the future of my 
belief. 
Any philosopher who assumes that every entity is necessarily 
constructed as a self–contained unit rejects the possibility of any 
dynamic activity of growth and remains within the static 
Hellenic mind–set and closed to an open future. In organizing the 
future of my belief, the opposite is the case. That is, I intend the 
dynamic actions of reflecting, engaging and growing while 
remaining open to the future.  
The dehellenization of my belief does not mean the rejection 
of Hellenistic philosophy and the substitution of another more 
appropriate philosophy as if the two had not been related. The 
term dehellenization is not a negative term, that is, it is not un-
hellenization. In positive terms, I experience dehellenization as 
the conscious creation of the future of my belief. Reviewing my 
intellectual history, I have come to understand that the task 
which awaits me is not the dismantling of one metaphysical 
system and reconstruction of another system, but rather the 
transcending of all metaphysical systems. In other words, my 
task is meta–metaphysical. My task is not only the transcending 
of Hellenic metaphysics which is but one understanding to be 
transcended. My task is, in fact, the transcending of all 





Given his context, it is understandable that St Thomas 
thought that the scholastic way of thinking was the only way to 
think. However, I am conscious of the fact that there is no 
necessary context or methodology that I must employ in 
philosophizing about that which is real. As well, there is no 
philosophical methodology that is natural or privileged in 
understanding that which is real. My life–world is one of 
increasing personal responsibility. My problems are those, 
characteristic of finding an appropriate intellectual and 
philosophical methodology for the interpretation of this 
responsibility. 
A phenomenological methodology has the advantage of 
incorporating, not just my intellect or ability to reason, but my 
entire personal experience in the act of believing. As I reflect on 
my personal experience, I become conscious that my knowledge 
of my contingency is insufficient. I attempt to overcome this 
insufficiency, however, through a conscious holistic 
understanding. A conscious holistic understanding is rooted in 
my desire to find meaning within my life. Since I live in a 
community of faith, the problem for me becomes whether or not 
I must presume any reason for or concrete expression of my faith 
to be applicable to everyone. The answer is no. While I am 
conscious of my particular creative freedom, I must not presume 
that the degree of my creative freedom is required of all. There is 
a difference of degree in the creative freedom of human beings. 
Others will have the unique experiences and outcomes of their 
faith in seeking meaning. Through my phenomenological 
understanding, I realize that the outcome of my freedom is not 
predetermined, as I once thought. I am not a fatalist. That is why 
I consciously and freely attempt to create the future of my belief, 
understood holistically, through the theological virtues of faith, 
hope and love. 
Because of the dissatisfaction with the philosophy I inherited, 
I now embrace a philosophy that is suitable to my increasingly 
mature theological thinking in order to give proper expression to 
my understanding of God’s relationship with me. This is my 
theological crisis.  




My theological crisis has to do with the epistemological and 
metaphysical questions which traditionally grounded Western 
theology and belief and which I inherited. In short, my 
theological crisis is philosophical. Therefore, my philosophical 
need is for a deepening of consciousness rather than for more 
information. A philosophical deepening of consciousness 
requires a re–conceptualized understanding of the relationship to 
my faith community and the world. In the process of a 
philosophical deepening of consciousness or re–
conceptualization, what I am conscious of is not that phenomena 
manifest themselves as real but that reality manifests itself as 
phenomena.  
I am conscious that in expressing my dehellenized 
theological understanding, I employ language personally but not 
privately. When I think, or talk about my life–world, I also create 
an essential relationship to the concrete world at large. In this 
relationship, I do not merely relate to my life–world and the 
concrete world at large, but I self–relate to my life–world and the 
concrete world at large. In my thinking, I become related to the 
concrete world at large as a self, that is, as a subject who knows 
of his relationship to his life–world and the concrete world at 
large. Thus, what I achieve in my language and thought is the 
creation of myself, of my identity through relating myself to both 
my life–world and the concrete world at large.  
The creation of myself is not done, however, by extracting 
truth from the experience about myself and duplicating it through 
a process of representation. Even though an insight may be the 
same for every philosopher, the remembrance of it is not, of 
necessity, the same for every philosopher. Remembering is that 
characteristic of consciousness which accounts for the fact that 
the more I actually know, the more I potentially know. Thus, 
when I remember anything, I enlarge my conscious horizon or 
awareness. Consequently, if I were to accept uncritically any 
pre–given conceptual and cultural form of theological 
remembering I would be preventing any enlargement of my 
conscious theological horizon or awareness. Accepting the pre–





Hellenism obscures any meaning which it once may have 
revealed and my theological crisis would not be resolved. Thus, I 





A challenging philosophical concept within contemporary 
Catholic theology is that of conceiving humanity as homo faber 
vis à vis that of humanity as homo creator. That is, man the 
maker vs. man the creator. My response to this distinction is to 
understand myself as “man the creator” rather than “man the 
maker.” (Although at times the latter does apply.) That is, rather 
than receive my “tools,” I create them in order to intend my 
future. I have rejected what I experienced to be an inadequate 
scholastic philosophy and have accepted a new methodology for 
the creation of the future of my belief. In reflecting from a “that 
was then, this is now” perspective, I came to realize that an 
evolutionary understanding of the world was not available to the 
Hellenists. This evolutionary understanding remains a defining 
characteristic in my life–world. 
In this evolutionary process, I re–create or differentiate 
myself by adjusting to my life–world and the given world at 
large through phenomenological philosophy. It is a characteristic 
of sentient life that adjustment to the given world is mediated 
through the senses. Further, in my life–world and in the concrete 
world at large I not only sense others, I also relate to others 
whom I recognize as being in the process of becoming or 
evolving, and who conceive of themselves as selves and me as a 
self.  
As an individual human being I am not the centre of the 
universe. I do, however, experience myself as part of both an 
organic evolutionary universe and a techno–architectural 
universe. As did the Hellenist philosophers, I too participate in 
the cosmos. Their cosmos, however, excluded the modern 
technological and evolutionary aspect of modern culture. 
Hellenist philosophers lived in a different world, one which 




lacked the modern advantage of evolution and technology. They 
reflected on their particular cultural experience of the human 
condition. Unlike the ancient Greek philosophers, 
phenomenological philosophers, myself included, reflect on our 
own experience of a co–creative evolution of being and 
becoming in the universe.  
To my mind, co–creative evolution manifests itself as a 
global phenomenon. As I arrive at each new level of 
consciousness within a co–creative evolution, I deepen my 
understanding. In this process, however, I experience nothing in 
the universe that tells me that the universe has been organized to 
satisfy or fulfill my needs or desires. Through my philosophical 
contemplation, I have no experience that any order or harmony 
of the universe is intended for my sake as a human being. Yet the 
revelation of God tells me the opposite. The universe is made for 
me. Revelation tells me that I am a steward of creation. Further, I 
conceive that I am more than a steward of creation. Having been 
made in the image and likeness of the creator of the universe, I 
share in the creative powers of the creator of the universe. Thus, 
as a co–creator in the universe, I ought to be faithful to myself 
and intend, in the presence of God, an order and harmony of the 
universe conducive to my own needs and preferences and that of 
my community. As a phenomenologist, I do not hold to the view 
that a parallel or alternative world independently exists. There is 
only one world. This world, the one in which I now live is 
constituted of my self–differentiated life–world and the concrete 
world at large. That is to say, the conception of any “other 





Within the course of my reflections for this book, I came to 
realize that major cultural changes have caused me to accept that 
a new philosophical age has appeared in human history. This led 
me to recognize that I am an agent of some of these cultural 





philosophically, my understanding of my inherited culture had 
become somewhat problematic for me. This was particularly due 
to the influence of Vatican Council II in which I began to discern 
the presence of God through the understanding of ressourcement 
and aggiornamento. 3   
One problem arising from the understanding of 
ressourcement and aggiornamento is how to identify, within 
phenomenologically philosophy, the Christian individual in the 
community as opposed to the Christian individual as traditionally 
identified in the church. Within the phenomenological 
understanding of the church of Vatican II, recognizing an 
individual as “in” or “out” of the church became a challenge for 
theologians after the Council. As I see it, they have managed to 
address this challenge to varying degrees of satisfaction.  
Those theologians subscribing to the notion of Catholicism 
rather than Catholicity, for example, understand that bishops 
alone are the successors to the responsibilities given to the 
apostles. Traditional bishops delegate some of this responsibility 
to the priest and deacon in a hierarchical structure. Given our 
contemporary ecclesial experience, I suggest that this 
hierarchical structure, while true, is more authentically 
understood today phenomenologically rather than scholastically. 
The phenomenon of hierarchical authority, as understood in 
Catholicity, is not ecclesiastical and is to be preferred to the 
political structure of hierarchy as understood in Catholicism. 
Credit must be given to those bishops who have become 
motivated to present the church’s teachings phenomenologically.  
As one of the new People of God, I desire a philosophical 
and theological understanding appropriate to my experience. 
This includes a philosophical attitude which leads me to self–
discovery and where I responsibly see for myself and responsibly 
do for myself in God’s felt presence. In failing to see God’s 
presence, I fail to “see” or “do” for myself. Since I undertake my 
                                                     
Ressourcement: a return to the sources, which implies less centralization by 
Rome; aggiornamento: the process of bringing an institution or organization 
up to date. Some Catholic theologians consider these as opposing terms.




self–discovery within a Christian community, I can clarify my 
particular insights in light of the community’s insights.  
Such inter–subjectivity reveals to me that God is ultimately 
differentiated from me, other individuals and the given world. 
God is wholly other, without contingency and not dependent 
upon me. I, however, am contingent and dependent upon God. 
Furthermore, through the inter–subjectivity of others in the 
Christian community, I participate in the mind of God. Better 
still, I participate in the presence of God, just as God partakes of 
my mind and presence. This is my Christian status.  
As a theologian, I can never complete my philosophical and 
theological tasks. However, in these tasks I need to embrace a 
philosophy that will reveal the appropriate theological expression 
of the meaning of the revelation of God to me. In my experience, 
the most appropriate philosophy in revealing this theological 
expression for me is existential phenomenology. Existential 
phenomenology makes it possible for me to reflect upon myself 
and the revelation of God in a manner that was not possible 






Theology Outside the Theological Guild 
 
Formal scholastic theology began as a professional activity 
within the universities. Its purpose was to serve the church in 
clarifying and formalizing doctrine and dogma. On the contrary, 
I contemplate theology outside any formal ecclesiastical guild 
that is committed to an institutional, political or polemical 
agenda. I contemplate theology as an ecclesial enterprise in the 
context of a community of faith, not as an ecclesiastical 
enterprise. The term ecclesial refers to a concrete communal 
relationship among the faithful. The term ecclesiastical refers to 
the historical governing structure of a Christian community. 6 
The doctrine and dogmatic formulations of the traditional 
Christian denominations are the result of reflections on the 
controversial theological interpretations of the church throughout 
its history. As a believing community, the early church needed to 
settle the controversies among the various theological opinions 
circulating in the local communities at the time. As a 
consequence, various doctrinal and dogmatic additions have 
accrued to theology over the centuries. In fact, these hindered 
theological reflection, and led to a religious understanding that 
did not always reflect or agree with the experience of the faithful.  
My experience has been that my theological consciousness, 
which is my understanding of doctrine and dogma, underwent 
development in response to shifts in philosophical thinking. 
These shifts in philosophical thinking changed my theological 
understanding. Thus, the way I now conduct my theological 
thinking is through critical reflection and outside a theological 
guild. Critical reflection is an innate activity of the human mind 
that reaches into the depths of experience and consciousness. It 
seeks insight into existential questions arising within the shifts in 
philosophical thinking.  
I think critically in order to create a future that will empower 
me to evolve authentically as human within my milieu and 
denotes a more biological being. Critical reflection allows me to 
transcend the social, political and religious experience and 
understanding that I embraced originally within a theological 




guild. As well, critical thinking discloses that philosophical and 
theological systems are not absolutes in themselves, but, 
according to Thomas, (1938) are contingent upon the culture in 
which they arise. Thus, critical reflection on my Western 
philosophical heritage reveals a movement away from supporting 
a publicly civil and ecclesiastical structure towards a personal 
and ecclesial community.  
Friedrich Schleiermacher was among the first to recognize 
this phenomenon of a philosophical change from one system to 
another. He believed that, philosophically speaking, humanity is 
a self–organizing, pre–theoretical phenomenon whose laws are 
not simply the laws of social or scientific mechanics. According 
to Brandt (1941), pre–theoretical humanity acted according to its 
spirit which is manifested in religious and ethical movements 
such as holism and emergent evolution. 
By reflecting on holism and emergent evolution outside the 
theological guild, I avoid the baggage of the political and power–
related controversies of the church that emerged in the 
Reformation/Counter–Reformation period and which are no 
longer relevant. By reflecting outside the theological guild, a 
new locus for fresh investigations into my religious experience is 
opened up to me.  
Thus, throughout this book the phenomenological 
understanding of my life–world has served to interpret that new 
locus. As a result, I continue to search for new and meaningful 
ways to reflect upon my religious experience outside the 
traditional theological guild. In my thinking, however, I cannot 
ignore the contributions of those other critical thinkers who have 
helped in shaping my past understanding. For me, their legacy 
exists, not by virtue of its own independent right, but because of 
its significance to my thought as a contemporary philosopher and 
theologian. Thus, my critical phenomenological reflection must 
take into account the legacy of artists, musicians, novelists, poets 
and psychologists. Of course, I must engage the legacy of the 
theologians whose critical phenomenological reflection has 
included the scriptures and personal accounts of their religious 





The holistic perspective discloses that an entity is other than 
and greater than the sum of its individual parts. That is to say, in 
holistic thinking, an entity discloses meaning beyond its concrete 
or phenomenal limitations. Within a holistic understanding, there 
are no limitations to the understanding of one’s life–world. 
Within a holistic understanding, the horizon of my consciousness 
is unlimited. Within a holistic understanding, I seek to discover 
the wisdom inherent in the relationships among entities that 
constitute the human and divine milieu.  
The purpose of my book is to introduce the inquirer to the 
evolution of my theological thinking. I do not intend to produce 
a theology that will be applicable to all people in all situations 
and cultures. My intention is to offer a model for critical thinkers 
wanting to act as their own interpreters, as Schillebeeckx (1984) 
has suggested. Of course, this model is offered within a 
community of believers and not meant to be followed in 
isolation. 
My point of departure for writing this book is, in fact, rooted 
in the first part of the conclusion at which Charles Davis arrived 
after writing his book, A Question of Conscience, in 1967. “I can 
see well enough that the fundamental intellectual problems for 
Christians today are the problems of our knowledge of God in 
relation to modern philosophy and the question of the uniqueness 
of Christ in the confrontation with the other world religions.” 7 
The process of phenomenological reflection is a descriptive 
rather than deductive process. The starting point for 
phenomenological reflection is the concrete human condition. 
Phenomenological reflection interprets experience in relational 
terms that undergo change and not through pre–determined 
norms that are not subject to change. Thus, the purpose of a 
critical phenomenological reflection is to criticize constructively 
the ideological, sociological and psychological attitudes found in 
one’s life.  
In spite of the emphasis given to the ecumenical dialogue 
that began in the modern world, Reformation and Counter–
Reformation polemics continue to exist. Because of these 
polemics, many Christians who participate in the life of their 




respective denominations often feel that they are alienated from 
the Church of Christ. Remember that from a dehellenized point 
of view, the Church of Christ subsists, not only in the Catholic 
Church, but in the various denominations as well. 
Scholastic philosophical thinking must present God as 
transcendent and outside of creation. Phenomenological 
thinking, however, discloses the presence of God, as immanent 
in, yet transcendent to creation. That is to say, when I think 
creatively, I feel the presence of God as immanent in, and yet 
transcendent to my life. In thinking creatively, I discover that I 
think and, consequently, act in co–operation with that which is 
“other and greater” than me yet is present to me.  
As Fabel, (1983), concluded from his scientific synthesis of 
Teilhard de Chardin, the destiny of the universe, including its 
human component, may well be controlled by the life that arose 
within it. As an individual human being, I am aware of a greater 
purpose than to be confined to my biological life within the 
universe. That greater purpose is to think and love within the 
hopes, aspirations and anguishes of my age — all outside the 
theological guild. 
For the purpose of thinking outside the theological guild, I 
propose that readers consider two distinct loci in their 
phenomenological reflection; the one concerning themselves and 
the other concerning their community. When conceived 
phenomenologically, the individual and the community are in a 
reciprocal relationship. Individual thinkers will present 
individual theologies and these theologies, in turn, will influence 
the experience of others. Such diversely presented theologies 
often develop negatively into a collective understanding or 
dogma. These arise from like–minded individuals and appear to 
be universal. As history has shown, such dogmatic confessions, 
appearing to be universal, have often later become merely 
normative for both the individual and for the particular Christian 
community.  
Narrowly focused, particular Christian communities do not 
present a universal system of philosophical thought of the type 





Thomas Aquinas. These particular Christian communities often 
embrace a biblical method of interpretation which appears to be 
universal. It is, in fact, narrow and particular.  
The scholastic method is one of integration. This held 
together up to the middle of the 20th Century, when the culture–
shattering events of the two world wars, the technological 
revolution, rapid developments in philosophy, psychology and 
the advancements of the social sciences and the humanities 
brought an end to medieval Christendom. Out of the end of 
medieval Christendom emerged a new philosophical way of 
thinking which now shapes the interpretive hermeneutic, that is, 
phenomenological philosophy.  
For Catholics in particular and Christians in general, Vatican 
II symbolized the end of a conventional understanding of the 
faith and introduced a new approach to the hermeneutics of the 
faith through a phenomenological and critical understanding. 
Vatican II was not merely an up–dating of doctrine and dogma, 
an aggiornamento, but rather a phenomenological interpretation 
of a ressourcement, that is, a return to understanding the sources 
that ground Christian belief. 
In general, two movements or identifiable trends characterize 
a phenomenological understanding of ressourcement. One is a 
return to and a reflection upon the patristic and medieval sources 
of theology. Another is a return to and a reflection upon the 
theological writings of St Thomas Aquinas. A third may be 
added; to return to and reflect upon the new philosophical 
movements of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. Such 
reflection will need to consider Modernity and liberalism as 
understood within the holistic philosophical perspective. And it 








Closing Reflections  
 
Obviously, no philosopher is ever completely original. 
(However, according to Patricia Shallow, poets are.) Since 
philosophy has a history which reflects the perspectives of 
various thinkers, the idea of philosophical originality is 
practically a contradiction in terms. As a philosopher, I live 
within an historical current of Western thought and thus 
incorporate something of the history of my predecessors into my 
own thinking. In reviewing an earlier age in theological thinking, 
I recognized that many present–day problems of current Western 
philosophy are simply the logical outcome of the so–called 
Modernist Crisis of not–so–long–ago. As I mentioned 
previously, I contemplate the process of re–constructing a 
Christian theology from a phenomenological point of view. 
Therefore, in fashioning my life–world, I enter both the 
philosophical and theological intellectual world which I have 
inherited, as well as the concrete world from which I have 
differentiated myself. This means, however, that I am in dialogue 
with but one world understood from two points of view rather 
than two different worlds.  
I have contrasted phenomenological theological 
understanding with classical or traditional theological 
understanding which is inordinately influenced by Hellenistic 
philosophical concepts. Therefore, I follow the insights of a 
dehellenized philosophy as suggested by Leslie Dewart, which 
presents a new philosophical perspective through which I 
interpret my theological experience. Drawing on his insights, I 
have focused in this brief book on the way my belief has been 
and continues to be shaped by relational understanding. Hence, 
“roles in relation to,” instead of “goals as an end,” are the subject 
of my attention. This means in the process of my theological 
contemplation, I need to pay special attention to the verb “to be.” 
For, linguistically and philosophically, “to be” means to be 
“some thing,” that is, an entity joined to or connected with an 
underlying ideal form. In Western thinking, a philosophy of “to 





Western theology. This dichotomous philosophical presumption 
is rendered unnecessary in a phenomenological understanding. 
Converting to a phenomenological understanding is a difficult 
task for many Western philosophers and requires a significant 
effort at sustaining one’s conversion. Intuitive understanding 
suggests that the way things usually present themselves is 
independent of one’s intention, and things are seen to be there 
whether we want them there or not.  
If I reflect upon my experience negatively, I conclude that 
Western civilization is dying. Things are not the way they once 
were. Contemporary life is decadent. The Christian values that I 
once acknowledged publicly are challenged within society and 
often appear to be only conflicting opinions. The media 
headlines suggest to me that, given the perpetual state of war and 
conflict in which the world is engaged, world destruction is 
possible. The moral principles that formerly held my life 
together seem to be disintegrating as the traditional supports of 
my life–world and the given world are undermined.  
However, if I reflect on my experience positively, the 
universe goes on because I am a cheerful and optimistic person. I 
believe that life is good and I sense that I am a part of a larger 
rhythm of creation. In fact, I am more than a part of that creation. 
I am a co–creator of that creation, both in the present and in the 
future. In my personal and public life I have expressed this 
optimistic attitude through my religious conviction and ordained 
ministry.  
Individuals often accept religion as but one cultural and 
sociological component among others. These include the 
philosophical, political and economic movements which are 
social constructions and which have characterized human 
development throughout the ages. Each of these social 
constructions has come about through human activity. It must be 
remembered that no human activity, whether religious, 
philosophical, political or economic requires any necessary 
system of interpretation. There are interpretive options. Further, 
no philosophical activity produces permanent facts but only 




provides temporary understanding that is contingent upon the 
cultural facts in which the thinking takes place.  
As soon as I give any meaning to my experience I enter the 
realm of philosophy, either formally in a tutored sense or 
informally through common sense. Philosophy is a 
contemplative activity reserved to humans living in society. To 
the best of my current philosophical awareness, there is at least 
agreement that brute animals cannot attribute meaning to their 
experiences. Humans, however, can do that. Members of human 
societies and institutions intentionally relate themselves to each 
other within the environment that is common to them.  
As a human, then, my theological insights are the fruit of my 
philosophical contemplation of the revelation of God within the 
church community. The church, which is constituted of 
individuals who are “called out” of the general human 
population, exists in response to a divine summons regardless of 
any particular cultural milieu. Thus, the church as a “called out” 
community provides the unique locus for the interpretation of 
God’s revelation. 
Yet, it must be remembered that the church does not exhaust 
the total People of God. The church as a social institution is the 
means whereby individuals are able to relate themselves 
religiously to each other. Further, it must be remembered that the 
decay or the growth of any social institution, the church 
included, will have a corresponding effect on those individuals 
constituting that institution. My experience has been that the 
church cannot constitute itself in the defensive and self–isolating 
context of decay. Rather, the opposite is required. The church 
must constitute itself as a self–constituting community open to 
future growth as the People of God.  
So, it is that my phenomenological philosophy, which 
supports my theology, has taken on the unique characteristic of 
personal self–discovery. Phenomenological philosophy satisfies 
my personal needs when: 1) its purpose arises from within my 
actual experience, 2) its purpose is to serve a definite function of 









Only after this book was completed and shortly before it was 
published, I obtained a copy of Leaves from the Note Book of an 
Unashamed Heretic by Paul Trudinger. Paul had taught me at the 
University of Winnipeg in a postgraduate programme in 
theology which I never completed. I recall how “unorthodox” his 
approach to theological issues seemed to be to us students. In 
hindsight, I believe he was undertaking his own version of the 
dehellenization process based on experience rather than 
philosophical critique. As the reader will no doubt have 
recognized, the dehellenization notion I presented in this book is 
understood within the Catholic Christian point of view. This is 
the tradition in which I was educated and taught to practice my 
faith. However, Christians of other traditions, like Paul 
Trudinger, may undertake a process of dehellenization in their 
religious lives without labeling it as such. Where I have focused 
on philosophy, Trudinger, a Quaker, has focused on personal 
experience. He writes: 
If I were pressed to say in one short statement how I 
would describe the shift in my thinking and 
convictions, I would say it was a movement away from 
a strong ‘Christocentric’ focus to the conviction that 
‘God’ must always be at the center…. In former days I 
would have hotly denied that having ‘God’ at the center 
required any weakening of my Christology. As I now 
understand things, my former Christocentric 
perspective carried with it particular constructions, 
interpretations, and understandings of ‘God’ – 
constructions which I now think, feel and believe to be 
unhelpful, and in many cases downright damaging, to 
our understanding of the relationship of God to 
humankind. I would not even call the shift one from a 
‘Christocentic’ to a ‘Theocentic’ position, because God 
as Theos, that is, the classical theistic position carries 
with it a model of God which, I believe, fosters the 




ideas of domination, of triumphalism, of hierarchy, and 
of authoritarian attitudes. These I believe to be 
unhelpful in our present situation in history; in our 
current sensitivity to religious pluralism and multi-
culturalism. I do not find such a view of God to be 
operative in my own spiritual experience of God 
personally speaking, nor in the context of the 
communities of faith when they are being faithful to 
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1 Edward Schillebeeckx (1967:284) makes a similar comment with 
respect to theologians. “It is always instructive to find out how great 
theologians went to work in their own time, not in order to imitate 
them, but so that we may also do, independently, in our own time 
what they did in theirs.”  
 
2 Tyrrell, George (1912: Vol.1: 119).  
 
3 Edward Schillebeeckx (1967: 99) writes: “A theological study was 
therefore, for Aquinas, a study concerned with the ‘first cause’ of 
things, whereas a philosophical study was concerned with things in 
their own value.” 
 
4 Alfred Firmin Loisy (1857–1940) was a French Roman Catholic 
priest, professor and theologian who became the intellectual standard 
bearer for Biblical Modernism in the Roman Catholic Church. He 
was a critic of traditional views of the biblical accounts of creation, 
and argued that biblical criticism could be applied to interpreting 
scripture. His theological positions brought him into conflict with the 
Church's conservatives, including Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius X. In 
1893, he was dismissed as a professor from the Catholic Institute of 
Paris. His books were condemned by the Vatican and in 1908 he was 
excommunicated. 
 
5 Daniel Guerrière (1990:13) is of the same view and writes that 
progress in philosophy is better understood through ressourcement 
rather than an advancement in thought.  
 
6 In her book, After the Church: Divine Encounter in a Sexual Age, 
Claire Henderson–Davis provides a perspective on theological 
thinking that is not ecclesiastical, but ecclesial. In my review of her 
book I wrote: “In ‘grappling with the meaning of life in a Western 
post–Christian world’ (Rosemary Ruether), Claire’s short work is not 
to be mistaken for an average self–help book. It is an example of 
contemporary practice of theologizing “outside the church,” as she 
admits. Though short, the book contains pithy, insightful comments 
arising out of personal experience. The book gives the impression 
that almost every word is weighed. The enduring value of this work, 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
to my mind, is that Claire invites us to follow her parents’ decision in 
our respective lives. “They stopped reading the story and stepped 
into the book” to find a new imaging of God. My initial reading was 
completed in one afternoon. However, the more enriching reading 
followed over the period of a few days. I had purchased the book on 
speculation that I might gain some insight into her father's 
theological understanding since I am doing research for a book on 
the theological similarities and differences among Charles Davis, 
Leslie Dewart and Gregory Baum. I read this book as a philosopher, 
but not presupposing any particular school, i.e., Thomist, Cartesian, 
Hegelian, etc. so as not to prejudice my appreciation of her 
perspective. Were I to discern a philosophy underpinning her 
thinking, I would identify it as holistic phenomenology. Whether 
one's point of departure in reading the book is as a philosopher, a 
theologian, a social critic, or a wounded soul, there are brief personal 
statements throughout the book that reveal a great deal about her 
fidelity to revelation in relating her growth through a variety of 
human personal experiences. If I have understood her correctly, I 
draw the conclusion that for some of us we may have to “leave the 
church” in order to “enter the Church” and leave the guilt behind. 
[The proposed book on Davis, Dewart and Baum was never written.] 
 
7 Charles Davis was ordained Catholic priest in the year I was born 
— 1946. He was a product of his intellectual and religious times, like 
all of us are. I became aware of the similarity of our intentions only 
after he had died and recall contacting his daughter, Claire 
Henderson–Davis, living in England, about memories of her father. 
Sadly, any and all correspondence I had with her has been lost. The 
following is abstracted from Davis’s Epilogue to his A Question of 
Conscience (1967:240). 
“Throughout the book my aim has been to give as honest an 
explanation as I could of the reasons, both negative and positive, 
which led me to leave the Roman Catholic Church. I have hidden 
nothing of which I have been conscious. 
Nor have I tried to work up my case post factum. I am writing 
these last lines in the middle of June 1967, not yet six months since I 
publicly announced my decision. I have done practically no reading 
directly for this book. I wanted to record for myself and for others 
the state of mind in which I made my break with the Roman Church.  
I have not attempted to be other than my usual self as a 
theologian. I can see well enough that the fundamental intellectual 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
problems for Christians today are the problem of our knowledge of 
God in relation to modern theology and the question of the 
uniqueness of Christ in the confrontation with the other world 
religions. But for reasons I have explained I regard the immediate 
problem as that of the Church, the solution of which will place 
Christians in a situation where they can tackle the other problems on 
the basis of a freely developing Christian tradition [italics Savage]. 
The Church was in any case the problem that faced me, and personal 
thought must arise from one’s own personal situation. 
So now I leave my book. I want to learn from others. I have no 
wish to forestall criticism, but there is a danger when much is at 
stake of imitating Bossuet, who, according to Friedrich Heer, ‘was a 
perfect man of the baroque, preserving what he knew was false 
because he was afraid of what might replace it.’”  
Davis died in 1999. 
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